



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POST-  
COLD-WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE NEW  
FRAME FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY**

by

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March 2006

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**EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POST-COLD-WAR  
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE NEW FRAME FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The end of the Cold War marked for Europe the entrance into an era of instability and violence caused by the collapse of the old communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. How the European security organizations reacted to those changes and new threats and transformed themselves for dealing with a new security environment is the focus of this thesis.

In particular, it gives an overview of the transformations that occurred within NATO and OSCE in the post-Cold War period, which have created and developed new security mechanisms and policies for dealing with crises.

The thesis further examines the consolidation of a new European security actor, the European Union, and the development of the military dimension through the ESDP, which is linked directly to transformations that occurred in Europe, being merely a consequence of those changes.

All three organizations proved their importance as stability factors of the European security system by launching crisis management operations, acting in ceasefire and post-conflict mediation, conducting preventive diplomacy, and spreading democracy and principles of human rights.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AFTER COLD WAR .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>NATO .....</b>	<b>8</b>
	1. NATO Transformation and Development.....	8
	2. NATO Initiatives in the New Security Environment.....	13
	<i>a. The Concept of Combined Joint Task Force .....</i>	<i>13</i>
	<i>b. The European Security and Defense Initiative.....</i>	<i>15</i>
	<i>c. NATO Enlargement 1995-1999.....</i>	<i>17</i>
	3. Crisis Management Operations 1994-2004.....	24
<b>C.</b>	<b>THE OSCE .....</b>	<b>27</b>
	1. Introduction.....	27
	2. Strengthening and Focusing Activity .....	29
<b>III.</b>	<b>BUILDING MILITARY POWER OF THE EU .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>EUROCORPS – A MOVE TOWARD EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCES .....</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.....</b>	<b>42</b>
	1. The Development of the Military Dimension of the EU .....	42
	2. The Debates on ESDP within the European Union .....	47
	3. The Transatlantic Debates on ESDP.....	49
<b>D.</b>	<b>EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>53</b>
	1. EU Approach to Peacekeeping .....	53
	2. Force Projection.....	58
	3. Operation “Concordia” .....	62
	4. Operation “Artemis” .....	63
	5. Operation “Althea”.....	63
<b>E.</b>	<b>THE WAY AHEAD.....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>IV.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>67</b>
	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>71</b>
	<b>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....</b>	<b>75</b>

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACO	Allied Command Operations
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control Systems
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA	European Defense Agency
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	EU Military Committee

EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPOL	European Union Police Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
HCNM	High Commissioner for National Minorities
HQ	Headquarters
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPP	Individual Partnership Plan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the beginning of a new era in international relations, and in the European security system in particular. It marked the end of the confrontation between two rival blocks of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, according to which principles the security mechanism was built. “In the early 1990s, the overriding concern of Europe’s decision-makers will be to contain the disruptive effects of the strategic earthquake of 1989: looking beyond this, however, the task is to develop a fundamentally new security system for Europe. A security system that incorporates the political, economic and military changes of recent years, and one able to provide a flexible but secure framework for a durable peace in Europe.”<sup>1</sup> The world was the witness of two major changes in Europe since World War II, with the most important of them being the unification of Germany into one democratic state, and the collapse of the communist regimes. These two major problems of Europe, which were the source of permanent tensions, were gone, provoking a large wave of instability and changes throughout the continent. The security system of the new Europe had to react and to deal with these changes. How have European security organizations addressed the after-Cold War instability? Did the changes in policies of major security organizations after the end of the Cold War achieve the estimates of the European community regarding the security issues? Are these changes adequate to the problems that are faced by Europe and how the newly created security system is dealing with them? What are the possible steps of Europe to enhance their own security? These are the major questions that this thesis will try to answer. Focus will center on the activity of the three main security organizations that dominate the European security environment: NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and defense components of the European Union (EU).

First, it is necessary to define the notions of ‘European security system’ and ‘European security organizations’. Probably one of the most pragmatic definitions of the ‘European security system’ is provided by the Helsinki Act of 1975, which described the

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<sup>1</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the Year 2010*, (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 1

notion of Europe and its security issues. But Adrian Hide-Price developed this term and said, that the European security system is a complex one of interrelations between national and international actors, "...an overall structure of the overlapping and interacting security relationships, commitments and institutional networks in Europe. Together, they form a complex configuration of military and non-military factors, with different levels and instances (global, regional, sub-regional, national or local), each with different degree of effectiveness."<sup>2</sup> The main concern of this thesis will be the military security of Europe as the most important component of the whole security system. The 'European security organizations' are major actors in the European security system, which is established for the purpose of dealing with all or a group of security issues.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, according to the view of many experts in the field, is the organization that most of all was influenced by the transformations within the European security system. It was first of all due to the proper aim of NATO – to be a defense guarantor of member states against possible Soviet Union attacks and expansion to the West. The Organization has fulfilled for years its main task, being a deterrent for the Soviet block and guardian of democratic values. But after the collapse of the whole communist-socialist block it faced the dilemma: what next?

The prevailing wisdom among security experts and many actors was that NATO, which had just celebrated its fortieth birthday, would not outlive the demise of the Soviet threat against which it was forged. Several European leaders, and most notably French president Francois Mitterrand, assumed that the European Community (EC: soon to be renamed the EU) would now aspire toward some form of autonomous security capacity – albeit within the context of a radically restructured Atlantic Alliance.<sup>3</sup>

The French President, as was proved over time, was right regarding the future role of the EU, but at the same time NATO had proved in the following years that it remained the main politico-military stability factor within the European security system. It appears that the factor of survival and new imposed roles determined the organization to be as flexible as possible to meet new challenges and requirements of the time.

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<sup>2</sup> Adrian Hide-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the Year 2010*, (London: Sage Publications, 1991),12

<sup>3</sup> Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keller, *Defending Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 6

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later in 1994 renamed OSCE) was a promising hope of Europe in the beginning of the 1990s, because it was established to play a wider role in European affairs, including military issues, and to deal with new security issues and threats. As it is stated in the official OSCE Handbook, “it [OSCE] deals with a wide range of security issues, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, election monitoring and economic and environmental security.”<sup>4</sup> The military activities, as the conducting of the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations under the auspices of OSCE, were planned initially to be developed and implemented if needed, but no military operation took place, thus determining in this way the true meaning of OSCE as a “soft” organization. OSCE had occupied its niche in the European security system, focusing on arms control, conflict prevention, humanitarian and human rights issues, but not on the full specter of security as it was intended early in the beginning. The OSCE had its unique role in post-Cold War security architecture, framing first of all the relations with new independent states that appeared on the map of Europe, and contributing to the considerable reduction of the conventional armaments on the continent.

The European Union is another major security player on the European continent that, especially during the last five years, made its voice heard and gained considerable importance in the complexity of the European security system.

Discussion on the military dimension of the EU and its security activity is definitely linked with the changes that occurred in Europe after 1989. Despite several military arrangements between some of its members, such as Anglo-Dutch military cooperation or Franco-German cooperation, there was no developed military dimension of the Union. It began to occur only in late 1980s and early 1990s with the launching by the French and Germans of the concept of Eurocorps, and did not have a strict progressive dynamic in the changes as, for example, NATO did. This was first due to NATO influence and its characteristic military position and importance for Europe through years of confrontation between West and East. And second, due to the approaches of its different members to that issue and their differences in military and economical capabilities. As Europe will later witness, these two causes laid the basis of

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<sup>4</sup> OSCE Handbook, 1

two possible directions of the development of military structures of the EU that was supported by different groups of members.

For some – namely the British, Germans, and Dutch – the WEU [Western European Union] should be developed as the ‘European pillar’ of the Atlantic Alliance, supplementing rather than replacing NATO. For others, such as the French, Italians and Spanish, it provides the nucleus of a more autonomous West European defense body, which should be closely associated with a more politically integrated Europe.<sup>5</sup>

The result of the adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was a combination of both these types of ideas. The EU had to demand more time in order to achieve an influential status in the European security system. And Europeans are working hard now to maintain and develop their status as an important player in that system.

Have these three organizations been efficient and receptive to the changes through which Europe has passed? It is a complex and difficult question. However, some answers could be seen in this early stage. All three organizations had their own way of reaction, and their own path to implement the internal changes and transformations. If NATO was forced to redefine its missions and to transform itself due to the elimination of its main threat, the other two were consolidating and strengthening their position and importance in the European security system, simultaneously reacting to these changes and building new institutions. Also, with a portion of credit, it could be said that they reacted relatively promptly to the threats and changes within the security system. There are skeptics of this statement, and probably some of their doubts are correct, but the practice showed the commitments of NATO, OSCE and the EU in favor of the enhancement of European security and stability.

Chapter II will offer a general overview of the activity of NATO and OSCE during the examined period from 1989 until 2004. that shaped their willingness and commitments to fulfill their tasks in order to meet and to follow the changes which occurred in Europe after the Cold War.

Chapter III looks particularly at the development of the European Union military dimension and its correlation with the events and changes in Europe. It will also show the practical achievements of the Union in doing so and the way to forge ahead in its

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<sup>5</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the Year 2010*, (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 133

tendencies to be effective and to have a strong voice in the shaping of the European security mechanism and stability. Main emphasis will be placed on the EU component of the European security system also due to the transformation of Europe itself, and due to the hopes of most Europeans that the so long awaited for unity of the continent will at last occur.

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## **II. AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AFTER COLD WAR**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

European Security organizations were the political institutions first to react to the changes of the European security environment since the Warsaw Pact collapsed. The time of changes obligated these organizations to make transformations in their doctrine structures and policies in order to meet the demands of the new security order in Europe.

During the Cold War, European security was based on the strong established balance between the West and East, which kept Europe under pressure, but at the same time in relative peace and stability. The security system was based on competition of two groups of European states constituting two military alliances. There were the attempts from the Soviet Union to substitute that system of two blocks by a pan-European organization when, in 1975, the Helsinki Act was proposed, but the level of trust and confidence was not so high as to permit that intention to be materialized. It was later, when the Berlin Wall collapsed, that the European security player – the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE since 1975, OSCE since 1994) – became a necessity to the new situation, instability and changes on European map, which required the forum for dialog and a security frame to incorporate the new states. Until this moment, two military security umbrellas, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were the two main organizations constituting the European security system.

The end of the Cold War eliminated the main threat for Europe, the fear of a Soviet invasion. The former allies of the Soviet block began to build new relations with the former enemies from West Europe. The German question, in the opinion of many experts, was solved; Germany became one unified state, with democratic state institutions and tied by all means to western democratic society. The western security mechanism, based on strong transatlantic relations, also required transformation. “In the absence of a major threat, NATO must ensure sustainability of transatlantic relationship if it is to

increase European security in the twenty first century. If NATO is unable to stabilize Eastern Europe without diluting its internal cohesion, the transatlantic relationship may be at risk.”<sup>6</sup>

## **B. NATO**

### **1. NATO Transformation and Development**

One of the conclusions of RAND analyst Richard Kugler dated back in early 1990s was that, “because the era ahead will be stressful and dangerous, there are compelling reasons for keeping NATO alive, healthy, and capable of meeting new security challenges, including those in areas beyond alliance borders.”<sup>7</sup> This phrase could be attributed easily to the evolution of the 1990s’ NATO. To keep alive does not mean to preserve, but instead to transform this organization.

Despite the main threat of Europe vanished in the past, eliminating the probability of an invasion with all its consequences, the need for NATO was evident. Europe had no military alternative to NATO in ensuring its own security. And from other hand, NATO for Europe was much more than only a military organization.

The first decade of the post-Cold War period was not the peaceful, cooperative era many assumed it would be – instead it saw largest air-land battles since Second World War take place in Iraq; four years of brutal war in South-eastern Europe that left an estimated 200.000 dead and several million refugees; a civil conflict in Algeria that resulted in over 10.000 death; and numerous civil and ethnic conflicts in Africa, some of which reached genocidal proportions. NATO no longer seemed necessary to do what it was primarily made for – containing the Soviet threat – but it continued to perform much deterrence, humanitarian and even war-fighting missions.<sup>8</sup>

There were experts who believed that NATO was irrelevant, especially the realists who were always skeptical about the importance of the institutions. “Realist scholars generally assume that, at best, international institutions are intervening variables affecting

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<sup>6</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 10

<sup>7</sup> Richard L. Kugler, *NATO Military Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), vii

<sup>8</sup> Philip Gordon, *NATO’s Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 3



security outcomes. Institutions are sought to promote a false sense of security, while states seek to maximize power within or outside the institutional context.”<sup>9</sup> But this realist postulate was disproved during the 1990s. NATO was an organization which found ways to enhance European security and to meet the new challenges.

The first steps in that direction were defining its roles and missions in a new security environment, and acknowledgement of the new situation.

It was the London Declaration of July 1990 which defined the guidelines for NATO’s transformation. It stressed the continuation of the strengthening of collective defense, and at the same time acknowledged the need for its further development in order to reflect the changes that occurred in Europe.

We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparable linked with the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build new partnerships with all nations of Europe. The Atlantic community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extended to them the hand of friendship.<sup>10</sup>

The Eastern countries were invited to establish relations with NATO forums, such as the North Atlantic Council, and to participate in politico-military dialog.

The London Declaration guidelines were materialized in 1991, in NATO’s new strategic concept at the Rome Summit. “It brought together political and military elements of NATO’s security policy into a coherent whole, establishing cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe as an integral part of the Alliance’s strategy.”<sup>11</sup> At the same meeting the Declaration on Peace and Cooperation was issued which defined the future principles of cooperation in Europe for more security and stability.

The new security strategy marked the abandonment of the Cold War flexible response strategy and outlined four fundamental tasks for NATO:

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<sup>9</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 3

<sup>10</sup> London Declaration of 1990, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b900706a.htm>, accessed 4 March 2005

<sup>11</sup> NATO Handbook, 17

1. To provide one of indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolutions of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
4. To preserve the strategic balance of power in Europe.<sup>12</sup>

NATO began to be an organization with much more political-military inclination, and a forum for European security dialog. At the same Summit, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established in order to provide a liaison body between NATO and former enemies from Central and Eastern Europe. This symbolized the beginning of the building of new “security bridges” between the West and East. At the Rome Summit member states agreed to place NATO in a new collective security framework of interlocking institutions.

The intent was to use international institutions to assist post-communist democratic and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and to establish a mechanism for early warning, preventive diplomacy, and conflict management as an amalgamated form of collective security. The US and Europe sought to enhance the capacity of institutions to meet the evolving challenges of post-Cold War European security. The primary impetus in this outreach to Central and Eastern Europe came from NATO, which helped its members organize a collective approach to address rapidly evolving set of security challenges.<sup>13</sup>

This system of amalgamated institutions, which included also the EU and OSCE, will constitute the main European security skeleton for the following years, with NATO thus supporting the efforts of other organizations to bring stability on the continent and to contribute to the building of the relationship of trust and confidence. “NATO is to

<sup>12</sup> NATO Strategic Concept 1991, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#II>, accessed 23 October 2005

<sup>13</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 62

provide military security for the West, and the EC is to promote economic and political integration. The CSCE is to become an institutionalized forum for promoting a wider political dialogue in Europe, as well as for fostering human rights and democratic values.”<sup>14</sup> This arrangement will prove to work, thus distributing all specters of European security issues among these organizations.

After the Rome Summit on other meetings and sessions, further steps were taken to develop and to transform NATO. The remarkable occurrence in this line of changes was the Brussels Summit of 1994 when NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. “The Partnership for Peace Invitation was addressed to all states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and other states participating in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), able and willing to contribute to the programme.”<sup>15</sup> This was truly a revolution in the relationship between East and West in the security field. In other words, the new Partners gained access to the NATO “door”. They were not allowed to enter yet but they had the possibility to look over the fence of the NATO yard and to talk with new NATO partners, which for the post-Cold War time was a big step ahead for stability and security’s consolidation. “In contrast to NACC, PfP was hailed as the cornerstone of a new security relationship between NATO and the newly democratic states in the East.”<sup>16</sup> The new program had traced five objectives that were included in the Framework Document proposed for signing to each aspirant country:

- to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- to ensure democratic control of defense forces;
- to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional consideration, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to

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<sup>14</sup> Richard L. Kugler, *NATO Military Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), 64

<sup>15</sup> NATO Handbook, 19

<sup>16</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter, *The future of NATO*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 65

- undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and others as may subsequently be agreed; and
- to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.<sup>17</sup>

The program provided that each Partnership country would have a two year Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) with the Alliance. This mutual agreed upon Plan will be a program of activities which would contribute to the extension of the cooperation among NACC members. In this sense, the PfP offered to new partners a consultation mechanism with the Alliance; it did not imply any mutual obligations in the case of a security threat to any partner. Achieving interoperability of military forces needed for common efforts in case of any multinational operation was another goal of the PfP program. This has to be done through a series of activities as part of an IPP, to include conferences, workshops, and military exercises. The participation of the partners in the PfP may also be appreciated as a preparation for eventual membership in NATO. The eventual enlargement of the organization was on the agenda of the Brussels Summit, with state leaders mentioning that they would welcome future enlargement of NATO.

The West had paved the way for new NATO members. Leaders of NATO countries realized that the organization should transform very rapidly in order to be synchronized with the whole process of changes in Europe. That included the inevitable expansion of NATO.

At the summit they announced the Partnership for Peace programme that would integrate the Central and East Europeans more completely and lay the basis for enlargement; adopted the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), in order to undertake the sort of mission they were already executing in an ad-hoc fashion in the Balkans more efficiently; accepted the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO as a goal; and announced a comprehensive approach to the new challenges posed by the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>18</sup>

As could be easily seen at the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO addressed three main issues that were very stringent in Europe in the beginning of 1990s: cooperation

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<sup>17</sup> Partnership for Peace program Framework Document, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>, accessed 5 April 2005

<sup>18</sup> Philip Gordon, *NATO's Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 2

with new European security players that appeared on the continent, generation of a multinational force capable of dealing with new security threats in Europe and out of area of responsibility, but first of all in Balkans, and stimulation of greater European burden sharing in ensuring European security.

## **2. NATO Initiatives in the New Security Environment**

### ***a. The Concept of Combined Joint Task Force***

The concept of CJTF was the reaction and a direct result of NATO practice in applying forces in multinational conflicts. The first Gulf War already required the changes in the approach toward that issue and the Balkans crisis showed the need for such forces.

Washington recognized that NATO could not survive if its sole military purpose was to deal with Article 5 missions. Indeed, there might be occasions when the US might decline to participate directly in a non-Article 5 NATO mission. The Clinton administration thus recommended the reorganization of NATO command structures based on CJTF that would permit the creation of an ESDI that was separable but not separate from NATO.<sup>19</sup>

The CJTF Concept was initiated in order to address three main objectives of NATO adaptation to the new security environment:

- Adjustment of NATO structure to new priorities and missions. NATO had to deal with crisis management operations, which required smaller units and multinational contingencies ready for immediate deployment;
- The need to operate out of area of responsibility, or to conduct non-Article 5 operations;
- Response to the intentions of European NATO members to develop own military capabilities under the ESDI.

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<sup>19</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 132

In this regard, there were three choices to respond with CJTF forces to a certain crisis: pure-NATO operations, NATO-plus operations, which may include NATO partners, and European (WEU)–led operations. The CJTF forces have to be ready to act on short notice and to be trained to conduct various kinds of peace operations.

In the Balkans, NATO commanders in many cases had to improvise their activity in an environment in which they had not operated before and having quite different tasks than those included in NATO documents and doctrines. “What is unique about NATO’s CJTF initiative – and unprecedented in military doctrine – is that it will permanently institutionalize the multinational task-force concept, which has always been a temporary command-and-control arrangement, employed by *ad hoc* coalitions.”<sup>20</sup> In this way, the Alliance was adjusting its military structures to perform new missions that require a multinational force flexible and suitable to address crisis management over a wide geographical area. Those missions will include “humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as collective defense. The forces required would vary according to the circumstances and would need to be generated rapidly and at short notice.”<sup>21</sup> The concept of CJTF admitted that those forces would include not only NATO assets and units but also partners’ units.

However, CJTF, as it was presented as a powerful initiative equal to that of PfP, was not as successful in implementation as the last one. It had more political than military obstacles. The U.S., for example, had concerns that the NATO infrastructure for Article 5 operations would remain intact and there would not be any duplication. There were also conflicting positions among Europeans regarding WEU-led operations and the use of NATO command and control structures. “By summer 1995, with the West floundering in Bosnia and the future of CJTF unresolved, some NATO planners expressed exasperation that prospects for making CJTF operational were slim.”<sup>22</sup>

By 1996, the NATO Military Committee had nonetheless agreed to six main principles which CJTF must meet: preserve the integrated military

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<sup>20</sup> Philip Gordon, *NATO’s Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 204

<sup>21</sup> NATO Handbook, 254

<sup>22</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 135

structure; provide for separable but not separate forces in support of ESDI; maintain a single command structure for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions; retain the role of Military Committee in advising and transmitting strategic guidance from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities (including the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, SACEUR, and SACLAN); avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies; and preserve the ability of major NATO Commands to do timely contingency planning.<sup>23</sup>

The full implementation of the concept began only in 1999 after a series of joint exercises and other trials. It had to take considerable time to have fully implemented CJTF with all headquarters, necessary equipment and trained forces.

***b. The European Security and Defense Initiative***

NATO's transformation could not be fully described without the mentioning of ESDI. This was NATO's response to the demands of Europeans for developing of its own defense capabilities. The aim was to create premises and to build forces capable to act in crisis response missions under the political and military control of WEU.

While realizing the changes around the organization, it was also a requirement for an internal transformation, a redistributing of forces. A component part of that, along with structural changes, was the European Security and Defense Identity. It was much more of an American initiative inside NATO, proposed under the circumstances of occurred changes in the European security system, as well as under the internal pressure in the United States, demanding from the U.S. government to make Europeans more responsible for own security. The encouragement for a 'European pillar' within NATO was both supported by both Europeans and Americans.

It [ESDI] was initially conceived largely as a technical-military arrangement that would allow The Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions – that is, strengthening the European Pillar of the Alliance” – by providing the WEU with access to those NATO assets and capabilities that European member states did not possess. But it also had a transformative political dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution, and on the part of the United States as the foremost NATO member state, to

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<sup>23</sup> Daniel W. Christman, "NATO's Military Future," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1996), 79

countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately ... the political message of ESDI – that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable – acquired more importance than the technical – military arrangements designed to provide access to NATO/US assets.<sup>24</sup>

The question about were to build ESDI arose: the U.S. wanted it in NATO, while some European leaders suggested outside the organization. This question soon disappeared due to the limited European capabilities and willingness to increase defense expenditures.

The debates about European defense capabilities that began to intensify in the middle of 1990s slowed down the implementation of ESDI. However, the Alliance reacted to new demands of Europeans. First, it tried to link ESDI with the CJTF concept – the last one would help to implement the ESDI. Second, due to the fact that the French were interested in re-approaching NATO, in particular to participate in NATO planning, the allies had given the role of training for that aim to ESDI. “On 16 January 1996 the French ambassador to NATO told his counterparts that Defense Minister Charles Millon would now take part in formal meetings of the Defense Planning Committee. Participation would be limited to matters where the integrated military structure was not raised.”<sup>25</sup> And third, NATO reached an agreement with Europeans in June 1996, the so-called Berlin Agreement, according to which NATO would help with the creation of the ESDI on the principle of “separable but not separate”. “This implied that a portion of the NATO structure would be made available for use by the WEU – ready to be “borrowed,” as it were – and thereby becoming a European pillar that was truly of, rather than separate from, the Atlantic Alliance.”<sup>26</sup> Here it is necessary to say that NATO has in this case the right of first refusal. The Alliance, on the proposal of Great Britain, went further, “creating a European Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) who, in addition to being Deputy, would also be the personification of ESDI and the strategic commander of any WEU-led operation.”<sup>27</sup> For example, during operations in Kosovo, Europeans participated under the command of D/SACEUR.

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<sup>24</sup> Jolyon Howorth and John Keller, *Defending Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8

<sup>25</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 141

<sup>26</sup> Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 13

<sup>27</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 138



Soon the arrangement for ESDI forced things to take a practical implementation. “In mid-1996 the theoretical debate over ESDI took on sense of practical urgency because of NATO planning for a post-IFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”<sup>28</sup> The situation on the ground required more forces. However, European allies, despite their will to build a European pillar within NATO, were not yet ready to take all the responsibility in Bosnia, thus asking the United States to maintain their presence.

**c. NATO Enlargement 1995-1999**

One of the major changes within NATO in order to meet the demands of the new post-Cold War era was its enlargement. The enlargement was the part of the whole complex of NATO’s transformation and was a result of other steps taken to modernize the organization.

At the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, there were some talks about future accession of new members in the Alliance, especially in the context of a new PfP program. But final documents had not contained any references to that issue. However, at the December NAC meeting, the final communiqué had an explicit statement in favor of enlargement. “It also introduced a catchall formula whereby the opening up of the Alliance to new members was viewed in terms of the development of “a broad European security architecture” (i.e., which encompassed ESDI) and parallel with the enlargement of the EU.”<sup>29</sup> This formula will follow the rule of NATO membership and EU aspiration for all time after that document introduced it and will contribute to the shaping of the European security system.

On the eve of the first wave of NATO enlargement, the RAND analysts were writing about the possible effects that could result from that.

NATO enlargement will be a complex political and military undertaking. There are both good and bad ways to enlarge. Depending on how it is handled, enlargement could stabilize a new European security order or contribute to either the unraveling of the Alliance, or a new Cold War

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<sup>28</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 139

<sup>29</sup> Jolyon Howorth and John Keller, *Defending Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 158

with Russia. Coming on the ruins of the Alliance's failed policies in Bosnia and in the aftermath of war, genocide and the failure of collective security in the Balkans, NATO enlargement will be the next test of the Alliance's ability to maintain peace and stability in post-Cold War Europe. The stakes are high. Failure could be disastrous, both for Alliance's future and for European stability.<sup>30</sup>

The risks were definitely high. But the advantages in case of success were also big. This crucial next move of the Alliance made a big impact on the European security environment. To understand the process of NATO enlargement and its importance for the further development of the organization, it is necessary to review the arguments pro- and anti- enlargement.

Among the proponents of NATO enlargement there were circulated several arguments in its support:

- Enlargement is needed to deter Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. Off course, a majority of the NATO planners and annalists understood that the Russian threat was gone once the Cold War was over, but in any case this argument was on the agenda. As Zbignev Brzezinski said, "it [Russian threat] is not justified, either by actual circumstances or even by worst-case scenarios for the near future."
- Membership should be offered because it will project the stability in the region. Or in other words, it will expand the zone of stability. One of the first West-European supporters of the idea of enlargement, German minister of defense Volker Ruhe, was insisting that if NATO will not export stability it will import instability. This was one of unbeatable arguments for NATO enlargement.
- It will take many years for the former communist countries to become economically powerful in order to be in the EU with Western countries, it is necessary that the West have to offer them something in order to ensure their prospects are integrated in the West society.
- Extending the Alliance will help to dampen aggressive nationalism and promote democracy in the region.
- The need to address the German concerns about Russia, especially about the fate of the states to its immediate east. As Kissinger has underlined, if something will go wrong in Russia it will lead to a "no-man's land" between Germany and Russia, which caused many Europeans wars.

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<sup>30</sup> Philip Gordon, *NATO's Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 94

- The enlargement is important for all members of the WEU to join NATO.<sup>31</sup>

Most of the experts agreed that NATO enlargement would extend the zone of stability in Europe and would enhance security in the region, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. But there were several concerns about expansion and they were linked with worries regarding Russian reaction to the enlargement. Among them were:

- Enlargement would strengthen the hands of radical nationalists and political opportunists in Russia, who will use NATO's action to discredit the current leadership and its pro-Western line.
- NATO enlargement will probably lead Russia to adopt a more aggressive policy in Eastern Europe.
- If the foregoing analysis of Russian domestic politics is correct, policy-makers in Moscow – reformers and radical nationalists – will characterize NATO enlargement as a change in balance of power.<sup>32</sup>

As one can see, Russia was considered the main obstacle and objector to NATO enlargement. On one hand, the West understands that expanding NATO to the East would be expanding the zone of stability. On the other hand, it may also wake up the “Russian bear”.

Addressing Russian questions successfully would create an even better environment for security in Europe. Strong Russian oppositions to “NATO expansion to the East”, as usually called among Russians politicians, was based first of all on the old fear for NATO as a rival which it had during the Cold War. The task of the West was to convince Russians that NATO does not bring any threat to Russia, but vice versa. NATO will not be an opponent for Russia but a partner in promoting security and stability.

During 1995, NATO conducted a study on the effects and modes of enlargement. It stressed that new members have to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to all principles and values of actual members.

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<sup>31</sup> For more information see Philip Gordon, *NATO's Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 123-127

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 128-129

According to NATO, enlargement seeks to avoid drawing new divisions on Europe after Cold War. In this context the enlargement study stressed that: “A stronger NATO-Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of a new, inclusive and comprehensive security structure in Europe....This further development of the NATO-Russia relationship, and its possible eventual formalization, should take place in rough parallel with NATO’s own enlargement, with the goal of further strengthening stability and security in Europe.” NATO-Russia relations would reflect Russia’s significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect, and confidence, and no surprise decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other.<sup>33</sup>

The task to ensure Russia to accept the enlargement was mostly put on the United States government. The Clinton administration had strongly supported NATO enlargement, and viewed it as a logical step in developing the organization and as a tool for spreading democracy in Eastern Europe. The administration had to make considerable diplomatic efforts to neutralize Russian resistance to the enlargement. In this way, the question of NATO enlargement had triggered an ample dialog between the East and West over security issues in Europe, being a catalyst in resolving some problems that Europe faced. However, in 1994 Russia agreed not to confront Europe, but to be a part of the dialog process. She joined the Partnership for Peace program and agreed to be a part of the dialog beyond the PfP. Later, in May 1997, NATO and Russia signed The NATO-Russia Founding Act – “the expression of an enduring commitment, undertaken at the highest political level, to work together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. It creates the framework for a new security partnership and for building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.”<sup>34</sup> Despite later disagreements over Kosovo between NATO and Russia, this partnership remained an important tool for keeping dialog with Russia regarding main security issues in the region. The importance of the dialog was confirmed in May 2002 when the NATO-Russia Council was created, thus underlining the continuity of this partnership.

In addition to the debates regarding NATO enlargement of the realists, there were also the debates among the institutionalists which dominated these debates and were in key positions that determined the enlargement issue. NATO Secretary General

<sup>33</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 98

<sup>34</sup> NATO Handbook, 82

Solana stated in one of his speeches, “what we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, civic space. I deliberately include our military arrangements into this definition of the “civic space.” The post-war experience in Western Europe suggests that political and economic progress and security integration are closely linked.”<sup>35</sup> Many advocates of the NATO enlargement had been sustaining the idea that NATO membership will promote the political reforms in candidates’ countries and would have a positive impact on the security and stability on the continent. Some of them even were in favor of the idea that the process of the joining of the West democracies should include NATO membership.

Internal NATO critics of the enlargement stressed, first of all, the issue of consensus in the NATO decision-making process. Bringing new members into the organization would undermine the process and would be more difficult to make one decision or another. There were also worries that the enlargement would damage transatlantic relations. The growing European opposition to the U.S. domination of decision-making in NATO would gain more allies of that view, and NATO internally may engage in a transatlantic struggle. Another issue was that many specialists in the field had an opinion that the enlargement was premature, that post-communist countries should be socialized with the western values, and with the NATO military environment. Taking them earlier from that process would not contribute to the democratization of and shaping of the security in the East. “As former EU chief Jacque Delors complained, the U.S. was “overhasty” in pushing for NATO enlargement, which was “a premature initiative which was badly timed.”<sup>36</sup>

However, despite all debates that were occurring on both sides of the Atlantic, the enlargement was decided. The question was: how and when it will occur? NATO was frequently criticized that it did not have a checklist of criteria that every potential member had to meet. In any case, the NATO Enlargement Study of 1995 set some criteria for new members, but it did not fix any such strict requirements. “Countries that want to join the Alliance first have to accept the principles of the Washington Treaty

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<sup>35</sup> Javier Solana, *Speech by Secretary General at the North Atlantic Meeting*, Athens, 20 May 1996, NATO Office of Information and Press

<sup>36</sup> Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 113

and have to strengthen NATO's effectiveness and cohesion, which means preserving the Alliance's political and military capability to perform its core functions of common defense, peacekeeping, and other new missions.”<sup>37</sup> The first wave of the enlargement that included the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did not have very drastic requirements, especially pertaining to the military part. When they were admitted in 1999, NATO also adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which included detailed requirements of the 1995 Study that each new candidate should fulfill.

According to the Plan, potential NATO members should – supplementary to the points of Enlargement Study – have settled the potential or actual ethnic conflicts or territorial disputes and should be committed to economic freedom, social justice, and ecological responsibility. In the military realm, NATO expects sufficient defense capabilities and a general determination to take on military responsibilities.<sup>38</sup>

The implications for NATO membership became wider. The MAP raised the level for admission and included not only the military commitments of states, but also political and social components.

A role in preparing the aspirant countries for the membership was assigned to the PfP. Despite the fact that the PfP provides a broad specter of activities that is arising the joint capabilities for crisis management, it also provides a framework for partners to become closer to an eventual membership in the Alliance. “By participating actively in a broad range of Partnership activities and processes, countries must inevitably familiarize themselves better with NATO procedures. It also helps Partners to organize themselves for working closely with NATO at political and military levels.”<sup>39</sup> Membership in NATO is not the scope of the PfP. But through the PfP future members could prove, in a number of exercises, their abilities to act together, and their willingness to commit themselves to common aim in management of crises.

Meanwhile, as debates over enlargement were going on, NATO got involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to stop the bloodshed in former Yugoslavia.

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<sup>37</sup> Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, *Ambivalent Neighbors*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 193

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 193

<sup>39</sup> Philip Gordon, *NATO's Transformation*, (Lanham, MR: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 228

Mounting IFOR, then SFOR, NATO proved itself as a guarantor of stability in that region. Bosnia had shown the wrongness of those who predicted, in the beginning of 1990s, that NATO was unnecessary for the European security system. NATO remained the only credible military force that could be used in the management of eventual crises. This was again demonstrated during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, when it stopped the genocide launched by central Yugoslav government against Kosovo Albanian nationals. The NATO air campaign soon made Yugoslavian president Milosevic conform to international law and norms. This operation proved again that NATO is a military force that can stop a crisis. But it also showed the disproportion of capabilities among the allies, especially those of the Europeans that taught them an unpleasant lecture.

The NATO anniversary Summit in April 1999, in Washington, symbolized a new NATO for a new century. Three new members joined the organization, while a clear sign that NATO is keeping open doors for future membership was sent to other aspirants. It also adopted a new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. “At this point ongoing enlargement was a policy driven by a clear logic. In the first place, it was consistent with NATO refashioned post-Cold War purpose - what the 1999 Alliance “Strategic Concept” referred to as the promotion of “a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment.”<sup>40</sup>

There were other candidates for NATO membership, but the frequently asked question which dominated debates after the first wave of enlargement was: to what point should NATO extend? Would future enlargement preserve NATO’s identity and cohesion? The first wave of enlargement showed how it could be politically costly, as well as high direct costs for integration of new members. However, despite these concerns, the enlargement was significant for demonstration of the Alliance flexibility to the new changes in the European security environment. Now NATO has to ensure that democracies in Central and Eastern European countries, new Alliance’s members, will not slide back.

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<sup>40</sup> Jolyon Howorth and John Keller, *Defending Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 165

### **3. Crisis Management Operations 1994-2004**

The North Atlantic Alliance got involved in crises management by launching a series of military operations as a consequence of the absence of any other viable military forces capable to intervene and stop violent escalations that erupted in Southeastern Europe after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

NATO stepped forward with military means in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the efforts of the UN, OSCE and EC to stop the atrocities and bloodshed did not achieve the goal. Using active military force against agreements' violators and forcing them to comply with UN resolutions, NATO managed to impose a cease fire and bring the belligerent parts to the negotiation table. In 1995, it established NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), which was followed by NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996, a peace enforcement operation with the mandate "to contribute to the secure environment necessary for consolidation of peace."<sup>41</sup> The operation accomplished its tasks successfully by the end of 2004 when the EU assumed the SFOR's responsibilities launching the operation 'Althea'.

In 1999, NATO launched massive air strikes against Yugoslavia in order to force its central government to stop the military operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Achieving that goal in June when the Yugoslav Army had withdrawn its military troops from the region, the Alliance established Kosovo Forces (KFOR), a major peacekeeping operation aimed to preserve peace and stability in Kosovo. KFOR is working in close cooperation with the UN and OSCE, supporting their activity directed at the introduction and development in Kosovo of democratic norms, institutions, human rights, and the conducting of free elections.

Another place where the Alliance has been involved was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On the request of the Macedonian government to help stop the escalations provoked by Albanian militants, their disarmament, and protection of OSCE border monitors, NATO responded by operations Allied Harmony, Essential Harvest, and Amber Fox. In March 2003, NATO handed over its functions to the EU which launched its own operation called "Proxima".

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<sup>41</sup> NATO Handbook, 116



Terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 made NATO invoke, for the first time, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, by launching operation Active Endeavor. This operation was aimed to monitor the situation in the Mediterranean area for suspected terrorist activity by using the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircrafts and NATO navy forces.

After the Taliban regime that had supported the terrorists groups fell in Afghanistan under the strikes of the U.S.-led coalition, and following the UN Security Council decision, in August 2003 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established. It became the first NATO out-of-area operation and involved forty seven countries. The task was to assist the Afghan government in maintaining a calm security environment and to help it build its democratic institutions.

#### **4. NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The entry of NATO into the 21<sup>st</sup> century was marked by the further development and transformation of the Alliance in light of new Strategic Concept.

The Concept sets out the Alliance's Approach to Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, reaffirming the importance of the transatlantic link and of maintaining the Alliance's military capabilities. It examines the role of other key elements in the Alliance's broad approach to stability and security, namely the European Security and Defense Identity; conflict prevention and crisis management; partnership cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.<sup>42</sup>

Two distinctive events influenced NATO's appearance after Washington Summit: the decision of the EU to build their own defense capabilities and the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

The Decision of the European Union in 1999 to build a military dimension of the union through ESDP was not met univocally among NATO allies, first of all by the United States. It triggered the long debates which lasted couple of years over the issues linked with EU defense capabilities and the transatlantic relationship.

The fears of duplication and decoupling that could damage the transatlantic links were among the most debated. The Alliance found compromises which lead not to the

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<sup>42</sup> NATO Handbook, 43

disintegration of the organization and of the European security mechanism, but to their consolidation, adding more responsibilities of the European allies to the common efforts to maintain peace and stability on the continent. The new NATO Strategic Concept and the “Berlin-plus” Agreement set the premises for mutual enforcing of cooperation between the Alliance and the EU. Both agreed that they are not competitors in crafting European security but are partners.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States implied new corrections to the whole process of the transformation and added a new set of challenges for the Alliance. The attacks “made clear what many Americans had been arguing sometime: that most of the threats to the United States and the NATO allies today emanate not from Europe but from beyond Europe’s borders.”<sup>43</sup> NATO for the first time activated Article 5 of Washington Treaty.<sup>44</sup> This case demonstrated the unity among the allies, as well as great support from partners. The concept of “non-Article 5” operation became much more important on the agenda than never before. On the eve of NATO strikes on Afghanistan, Russia, surprisingly for most of analysts, had shown strong support for the coalition, which brought her closer to the Alliance as a partner in opposing a common threat – international terrorism. This fact also served for the reviving of many cooperative talks in the NATO-Russia Council.

At the same time, the Iraq war that followed had shown a new political configuration that shaped the Alliance and some rift among the allies over that issue. In any case, NATO demonstrated later the ability to overcome a difficult situation and preserve its unique military alliance, meanwhile acknowledging that this type of disagreement could weaken NATO in the future.

The terrorist attacks had also sped up the process of NATO enlargement that lead to the historic Prague Summit in November 2002, when seven new members, Bulgaria,

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<sup>43</sup> Stephen Larrabee, *NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 30

<sup>44</sup>Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>, accessed 23 October 2005

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, were invited to join the organization in 2004. The process of cooperation achieved a point that enhanced the hopes for an irreversible process of consolidation of the security in Europe. “The September 11 attacks also underscored the importance of the allies and alliances to fight the war on terrorism –wile reinforcing that fact that NATO had to continue to change so that it could be as effective in meeting the threats of the future as it had been helping win the Cold War.”<sup>45</sup>

Currently, NATO is going through a period where there are many questions asked. The big debate is on NATO’s future strategic rationale and transformation, its aptitude to deal and cooperate with Eastern countries and with new threats. “How this debate evolves will have a profound impact not only on NATO’s policy toward the East but also on whether NATO remains the prime vehicle for managing US and European security interests in the future.”<sup>46</sup>

The North Atlantic Alliance was the organization that proved itself very flexible to the changes of the security environment in Europe. It met promptly the challenges that were thrown its way, from crisis management to terrorism. NATO also proposed several initiatives to its members and its partners when responding to the demands of the created situation in order to bring more stability and security to the region.

## **C. THE OSCE**

### **1. Introduction**

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, from January 1994 on – OSCE) is unique in its role of a security organization. The idea goes back to the years of the Cold War and belongs to the Soviet Union, which proposed the establishment of a pan-European organization or conference, which will have as members all European states. The hidden scope of the proposal was to diminish the influence of the West over the continent and to legalize the existing borders drawn after World War II. The West initially was very reserved to that proposal, but afterward agreed if several

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<sup>45</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 305

<sup>46</sup> Stephen Larrabee, *NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003),

conditions would be met: "... full participation of the United States and Canada, reconfirmation of the legal status of Berlin, a discussion of conventional disarmament in Europe and the inclusion of human rights issues on the agenda of conference."<sup>47</sup>

These conditions were accepted by the Soviets, and on August 1 1975, after years of negotiations, the Helsinki Final Act instituting the CSCE was signed. Except Albania, the CSCE incorporated all European countries, plus the U.S. and Canada.

The activity of the CSCE during the Cold War, however, inevitably was influenced by the confrontation of the West and East, but it was an available platform for dialogue outside of the two blocs' contacts that served for talks on such important issues for European security and stability as conventional armament reduction and human rights.

The stringent need for CSCE appeared after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Most countries accepted the need for an enhanced pan-European organization, building on the CSCE. The rationale was in part symbolic, since a pan-European organization reflected a non-divided Europe. For West Europeans and the United States, the CSCE was something to offer nations of Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union, which they were not willing to welcome into existing Western security groupings (NATO, the EC, and the WEU). For the Soviet Union (later Russia), the CSCE was a place to participate on an equal footing with the West.<sup>48</sup>

There was an understanding that in a newly created situation the role of the CSCE should be higher than it was before. Europe needed to overthrow the consequences of the impact of the confrontation era over the international relations in the past and build new relations that would be a consolidator of the peace and security on the continent. Development of these relations of trust and confidence among states was one of the primary tasks of the CSCE. The confidence building measures between states became an indisputable issue on the CSCE agenda.

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<sup>47</sup> OSCE Handbook, 7

<sup>48</sup> James B. Steinberg, *Overlapping Institutions, Underinsured Security: The Evolution of the Post-Cold War Security Order*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), 4

## **2. Strengthening and Focusing Activity**

The CSCE evolution to a greater institution, and with much more responsibilities, had occurred in many respects due to the pressure of the needs which Europe emphasized in the beginning of the 1990s. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted at the CSCE historic meeting in November 1990, reconfirmed the principles of the Helsinki Final Act for Euro-Atlantic area that had to govern the European international relations for the future. These principles include such dimensions as democracy and rule of law, human rights, security, economic liberty, and friendly relations among the participating states.

By having more means to implement, develop and spread these principles throughout European states, in Paris the CSCE stepped forward in the direction of institutionalizing the Conference by establishing new CSCE institutions: the Council, consisting of ministers of Foreign Relations of Participating states; the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO); the OSCE Secretariat; Conflict Prevention Center (CPC); and the Office for Free Elections. This served as perfect basis for further enforcing of the CSCE through conducting a series of meetings and developing policies and guidelines for future activity and functionality of the Conference. The CSCE became a forum for building trust and confidence in Europe, which would be "... a source of peace, open to dialog and co-operation with other countries, welcoming exchanges and involved in the change of common responses to the challenges of the future."<sup>49</sup>

Thus, in Paris the Conference was invested with much hope for the future of European security. However, time showed that not all aspirations were satisfied, resulting in failures and disappointments. Some experts claimed that the Paris meeting was dominated by euphoria, optimism and confidence,<sup>50</sup> keeping in mind that reality was a little bit different, and even blaming Western leaders of lack of political will and commitment of resources for establishment of a truly European security organization.

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<sup>49</sup> Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 5, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf), accessed 24 March 2005

<sup>50</sup> See for example, Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), vii

Despite that, the invigoration and institutionalization of the CSCE continued in the following years, paving way for a real security organization. Many hopes were attributed to the Helsinki CSCE Summit that took place in July 1992.

Between the Paris and Helsinki Summits, a series of meetings were held which were aimed to materialize the Chapter of Paris provisions as well as to react to the security threats that erupted in former Yugoslavia. For example, “at the first Council meeting in Berlin of 19 and 20 June 1991 a special mechanism for emergency consultations was established. The so-called “Berlin mechanism” was used almost immediately in confronting the crisis in Yugoslavia.”<sup>51</sup> In the same crisis management context, at the Prague Council meeting in January 1992, the rule of consensus was modified to “consensus minus one”, allowing the CSCE to deal with the situations when a state will not conform to the CSCE commitments it made.

To give more functionality on a different level of its activity and to help the implementation of taken decisions at the CSCE Helsinki follow-up conference the member states agreed on establishment of additional institutions: Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC), High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), and Economic Forum. They also established the post of the Chairman-in-Office for “the coordination of and consultation on current CSCE business.”<sup>52</sup> The creation of the position of the High Commissioner for National Minorities was highly demanded for dealing with ongoing conflicts in Europe and for the prevention or diminution of eventual conflict situations. The HCNM proved its effectiveness in intervening in situations with minorities’ issues in the Baltic States and Central Europe.

In the widely adopted document entitled ‘The Challenges of Changes’<sup>53</sup> the participating states were called to intensify the dialog and consultations, for development of a crisis response mechanism through enhancing CSCE’s role and means in the settlement of disputes, as well as through strengthening the potential of the Conflict Prevention Center. It was declared that the CSCE may perform peacekeeping, fact-finding and rapporteur missions. To conduct these missions, “the CSCE may benefit from

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<sup>51</sup> OSCE Handbook, 14

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 15

<sup>53</sup> CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities.”<sup>54</sup> In such a way was stressed that cooperation with other organizations in achieving the CSCE goals, especially in crisis management area of its activity, is one of the main building blocks of the CSCE security policy.

Further institutionalization of the CSCE occurred at a Stockholm foreign ministers meeting in December 1992. The member states agreed to establish the Office of Secretary General of CSCE, Commission of Conciliation, and Court of Arbitration. The CSCE was growing and transforming into an organization with all its necessary components.

All these changes in structure and “mandate” of the CSCE were taking place on a background of tensions and conflicts that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This was one of the determining driving factors in the reformation of the Conference, requesting from member states much more responsibilities and willingness to enforce peace and stability, and to deal with all consequences of the conflicts. For that purpose there were established a number of field missions to make it easier and much more effective the involvement of the CSCE in monitoring the crises.

The Budapest CSCE Summit of December 1994 was formally aimed to finalize the CSCE’s institutionalization and to add more strength to its activity. At the Summit it was decided “...to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, thus enabling it to play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century”<sup>55</sup>, and in order to reflect this goal the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Besides the change of its name, the following changed names as well: the CSCE Council became the Ministerial Council, the Committee of Senior Officials became the Senior Council, and the Permanent Committee became the Permanent Council. These name changes were not aimed to show the internal restructuring within

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<sup>54</sup> CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

<sup>55</sup> CSCE Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Summit Declaration, Internet [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

the organization, but to point to the greater identity of the organization and the role that has to be played by it in European security.

At the same time, when performing the strengthening of its executive bodies and institutions on different levels, the OSCE had to initiate the discussions on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century based on OSCE principles. This model “will not affect the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.”<sup>56</sup> This process lasted five years and ended by the signing in November 1999 at the Istanbul Summit of the Charter for European Security<sup>57</sup>.

At the Budapest Summit, Europe witnessed again, as it did at Paris and Helsinki, another attempt of the Euro-Atlantic community to meet the security challenges that Europe faced in early 1990s, but without binding participating states by a legal mechanism, other than common political declarations and decisions.<sup>58</sup> This was due to several factors that influenced the decisions taken during meetings.

The essential factor was the domination of the competition of views shared by two different groups of member states on the issue of the structure of the European security system. The so-called “Atlanticists,” lead by the United States, were firmly defending the position that the CSCE’s “consensual process would make it incapable of action, that its size alone meant cumbersome and irresolute response to crises, and that states would not submit themselves to CSCE authority.”<sup>59</sup> In this regard, it would not be efficient and effective in bringing adequate responses to the problems that would arise in Europe. Behind this official position was the protection of “old U.S. prerogatives as NATO’s dominant alliance partner,”<sup>60</sup> leaving room to be involved in the OSCE but without legal obligations. On the other hand, the so-called “Europeanists,” lead by

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<sup>56</sup> See for more information CSCE Budapest Document 1994 “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, 26, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

<sup>57</sup> See for more information Charter for European Security, Internet, <http://www.unece.org/ead/osce/osceunece/istachart99e.pdf>, accessed 23 October 2005

<sup>58</sup> See for example, Sapiro Miriam, “Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation”, *The American Journal of International Law* 89, (July 1995): 631-637

<sup>59</sup> Daniel Nelson, *America and Collective Security in Europe*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 111

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 111



France, pledged for an agreement-bound organization with the aim to consolidate the European “party” and diminish American influence in European affairs. Another argument for an “OSCE-first” policy was the relieving of the UN of additional burdens with respect to disputes arising within the OSCE region.<sup>61</sup> However, that view has not gained much support due to the fear that a treaty would have the potential of a divisive force that could split Europe upon its ratification. Thus, the OSCE has not become an organization with legal authority “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, as was ideally desired by some members, but an organization where the decisions of which were bound by political commitments of participating states.

This kind of policy toward the OSCE was followed during the next few years. At the Lisbon Summit, Vice President Albert Gore in his speech made clear the U.S. position regarding the status of the organization.

Yes, the OSCE is evolving rapidly, flexibly and inclusively. But at the same time, the OSCE does not need to be transformed into the only orchestrating instrument of European security. We should celebrate the special contribution of this community of cooperation and values, rather than compressing it into legalistic framework. Treaties have their place, but we believe that the OSCE will succeed best on the basis of its flexible political commitments.<sup>62</sup>

The conflict of interests of its major members within the organization was a factor that shaped the ability and functionality of the OSCE to deal with the tasks and problems for which it was designed.

The Charter for European Security, adopted at Istanbul in November 1999, has been announced as a comprehensive model for security on the European continent for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It has not brought something revolutionary in the existing security system but has reaffirmed the basic principles of the OSCE, reviewed the new risks and

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<sup>61</sup> P. Terrence Hopmann, “Managing Conflict in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The Role of the OSCE in Europe’s Security ‘Architecture’”, *International Politics* 40, (March 2003): 75, Internet, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=388489801&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1117078198&clientId=11969>, accessed 24 March 2005

<sup>62</sup> Albert Gore, “The Role of the OSCE in European Security”, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol.7 (Washington: December 9, 1996), 599, Internet, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=11052719&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1117081682&clientId=11969>, accessed 24 March 2005

challenges to what Europe has been exposed to in the last decade of the previous century, provided the further strengthening of the OSCE's operational capabilities for crisis management and prevention of conflicts.

The Charter has reaffirmed that OSCE is “a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.”<sup>63</sup> Cooperation with other organizations is considered by the Platform for Cooperation and Security, which was issued at the Istanbul Summit as well, the prerequisite for “full use of resources of the international community”<sup>64</sup> for addressing the entire specter of the European security issues. In order to respond to the specific crisis situations, the OSCE proposed itself as a flexible framework for cooperation.

### **3. Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Measures**

An important component of the OSCE activity is also the contribution to the military security of Europe. This is conducted through the implementation of a series of documents on arms control and confidence and security building measures (CSBM), and is a constituting part of the whole OSCE security process.

The Charter of Paris established the CPC, a body which was tasked to deal with military issues that were challenging European security, as well as to promote among the participating states the CSBM. The further development of the OSCE in that area of activity led to the creation by the decision of the Helsinki Summit of the Forum for Security and Cooperation, a high level diplomatic forum that will also include the strengthened CPC, which “will ensure that their efforts [member states] in the Forum towards arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention are coherent, interrelated and complementary.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Istanbul Document 1999, 2, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf), Internet, accessed 25 March 2005

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 3

<sup>65</sup> CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, 30, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

A net of arms control and mutual confidence's support agreements and documents was built under the umbrella of FSC that aimed at the decreasing of levels of held conventional arms of OSCE member states, reducing of the potential to conduct large attacks on each other, providing transparency and mutual confidence, and promoting important norms for politico-military aspects of security. These documents, which had been adopted during the first three OSCE summits, include: CFE Treaty, concluded in November 1990; Vienna Document; Treaty of Open Skies; Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personal Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; Code of Conduct; Global Exchange of Military Information; and Principles governing arms transfers and non-proliferation.

Due to its legal status, OSCE does not deal directly with arms control agreements. The implementation of the CFE Treaty and Treaty of Open Skies is supervised by the Joint Consultative Group and Open Skies consultative Commission respectively, which are working under the OSCE auspices and are OSCE related bodies.

An important move for strengthening the arms control and CSBM efforts was done at the Lisbon Summit where the Framework for Arms Control was adopted, "integral to the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security."<sup>66</sup> At Lisbon, there was also developed the agenda of the Forum for Security and Cooperation for the enhancement of the efficiency of the existing arms control and CSBM documents, and development of new arrangements that will increase transparency and predictability of security relations among OSCE participating states.

A major development in arms control occurred in November 1999 with the signing of the Adapted CFE Treaty. After completion in 1995 of the reduction period resulting in destroying of more than 58,000 major conventional arms in five categories – tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters – CFE member states agreed to adopt the existing Treaty which was based on block principle and containing the spirit of the Cold War. The adaptation took into account the last developments of the situation within the Treaty's area of application.

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<sup>66</sup> Lisbon Document 1996, 17, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1996/12/4049\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1996/12/4049_en.pdf), accessed 25 March 2005

Unfortunately, after almost six years, the Adapted CFE Treaty has not entered into force yet due to unresolved concerns of major participants on some principles' issues and obligations that were not yet fulfilled.

#### **4. OSCE's Perspective**

The OSCE, despite the many negative labels obtained from its critics, continues to be the security frame-organization for all European countries, a unique organization with a large arsenal of competencies. Its uniqueness rests on fact that "the interconnected areas of preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, and post-conflict reconciliation constitute the one most important function that the OSCE has carved out for itself. These tasks are not carried out adequately by any other regional institution"<sup>67</sup>, and in some cases OSCE capacity may exceed that of the UN.

As the OSCE Handbook states, the basic priorities of today's organization are:

- to consolidate the participating States' common values and help in building fully democratic civil societies based on the rule of law;
- to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn areas;
- to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new political, economic or social divisions by promoting a co-operative system of security.<sup>68</sup>

Through the FSC, the OSCE will continue to be a framework for arms control and confidence and security building measures.

The conflict prevention and management of crises through mediation and negotiation will keep much of the attention of the organization because of the tensions' persistence in some parts of the OSCE area of responsibility and unresolved post-conflict situations or frozen conflicts that still remain the cause of instability and threat to security. The grain of the OSCE's policy when addressing issues of the management of

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<sup>67</sup> P. Terrence Hopmann, "Managing Conflict in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The Role of the OSCE in Europe's Security 'Architecture'", *International Politics* 40, (March 2003): 75, Internet, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=388489801&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1117078198&clientId=11969>, accessed 24 March 2005

<sup>68</sup> OSCE Handbook, 17

conflicts has to remain a complex set of measures that OSCE has: prevention diplomacy, confidence and security building measures, long-term conflict prevention, ceasefire mediation, human rights and rule of law monitoring.

There are also some difficulties which the OSCE is facing along its daily political and operational activity. The most evident is reaching the consensus, or near consensus, among 55 participating states on the issues that request short-time response or intervention. The big problem of the OSCE remains that it continues to be seen by bigger members as a tool for promotion of their own interests. It refers to the European Union, the United States, and Russia. Each is using that part of the OSCE's offered opportunities that is more convenient for their foreign and security policy, rather than be a promoter of the full range of tools which OSCE holds. For example, the United States and the European Union are focusing mostly on the human dimension of the OSCE, while paying less attention to the politico-military dimension. Russia is doing the opposite, and wants to make the OSCE out to be a central security organization in Europe, while complaining that the OSCE has double standards and is paying too much attention to human rights and elections. The answer to "why" for both positions is obvious for all.

This year the OSCE is experiencing problems with the budget, and Russia is delaying its approval due to its concerns regarding the OSCE's agenda. Relating to this issue, the current OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitij Rupel, addressed the problem in three points: Russia has to negotiate constructively over its concerned issues and participate much actively in OSCE missions and institutions; the United States and EU have to devote much attention to politico-military issues and "stop treating the OSCE as if were little more than a NGO"; and all OSCE countries have to devote high-level political attention to the Organization effectively using its security instruments.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Dimitij Rupel, "Cold War Echoes", *Washington Post*, 7 March 2005, Internet, [http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/03/13642\\_198\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/03/13642_198_en.pdf) April 11 2005

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### **III. BUILDING MILITARY POWER OF THE EU**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The European Union in last several years gained its own place in the European security architecture. Being basically a political and economical organization it realized that to be a real player in European and world affairs it should have a military dimension as a part of the whole European spectrum of interests. Introducing of a military dimension on the agenda of main European issues was supported also by the obvious need in 1990s for efficient forces that could be involved in crisis management, which became a painful reality in Europe, too.

The Balkan crisis showed the inadequacy of European commitments for such a situation, the gap in military capabilities between Europe and the United States, and served as a big impulse for the development of European defense capabilities. It lead first to the St. Malo Agreement in December 1998 between France and Great Britain that evaluated the situation and put the corner stone in future European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

ESDP represents a response by the Europeans to the changes in the security environment of the continent as a result of the intervening of internal and external security threats, of the EU integration process, of their responsibility for their own security, and of willingness to enhance the European voice in regional and international security system. There were previous European arrangements for common multinational forces, such as EUROCORPS and EUROMARFOR, made in frame of WEU. But to boost the “European party” in crisis management it was necessary for a much more qualitative and quantitative complex arrangement between all members of the EU as the one that became the ESDP.

The practical steps taken by the EU in management of crises were the launching of several operations. It got involved in the Macedonian crisis and stepped forward by setting, in 2003, a military operation called “Concordia,” followed by the police operation “Proxima”. In the same year, the EU firmly responded to the escalated crisis in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, launching the first “out of area” peacekeeping operation code-named “Artemis”. The last major European commitment in

peacekeeping was the takeover of the Bosnian operation from NATO and setting its own operation under the European command named “Althea”. The conducting of all these operations demonstrated the ability of Europeans for crisis management as well as the rightness of the decisions taken by the EU within defense area.

## **B. EUROCORPS – A MOVE TOWARD EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCES**

In January 1963, the French and German governments concluded a controversial Elysee Treaty on cooperation in defense issues. Many experts immediately link this Treaty as a French response to the U.S.-British Nassau Conference that resulted with British possession of the Polaris missiles. President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer agreed on the Treaty that was aimed to enhance the cooperation between two former enemies, to reconcile Franco-German relations and to move toward the European integration, according to the de Gaulle concept of Europe.

Ironically, the Elysee Treaty would achieve its potential and prove its worth as a cornerstone not of intergovernmentalism in the EC but of closer political and economical integration...Subsequent French presidents and German chancellors, as well as a host of government ministers and officials similarly stuck to a fix schedule of bilateral meetings. With the rapid improvement of Franco-German relations in the early 1970 and a growing consensus in both countries about the utility of European integration, these frequent, institutionalized contacts became a major driving force of European integration.<sup>70</sup>

The major move toward European defense issues was symbolized by the fruitful German-French cooperation in the era of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. After a joint military exercise in 1987, Kohl proposed the creation of a mixed Franco-German unit, which was surprisingly accepted by the French President. Thus, in 1989 the Franco-German Brigade was formed, “characterized by an integrated military staff under alternating command with a few integrated support units. This brigade was referred to by chancellor Kohl as the nucleus of a “European Army.”<sup>71</sup> Some other countries showed their interest in the Brigade “project”. It became operational in October 1991 and was

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<sup>70</sup> Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 44

<sup>71</sup> Peter Schmidt, *The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1993), 16, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai08e.html>, accessed 15 March 2005



made directly responsible to the EU and WEU, later becoming known as Eurocorps. This was the famous initiative of the French and German leaders laid out in their letter to the EC Council. “Both countries have announced concrete steps toward implementing the declaration of the WEU Council in Maastricht to establish a Military Planning Cell and to earmark military units answerable to WEU.”<sup>72</sup> The spirit of the “European Army”, as we see, had not vanished; it was revived again in the minds of European politicians.

Formally, Eurocorps was founded in May 1992 at the La Rochelle Summit, establishing its HQ in Strasbourg. The WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 that followed defined its role as the defense component of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty, and as a means of reinforcing the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance. This Declaration was also significant due the fact that it announced the so-called Petersberg tasks for crisis management, which became a cornerstone for the future European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU. The text from the WEU Petersberg Declaration regarding the issue of peacekeeping was included in the European Union Treaty. Article 17.2 of the treaty specifies the missions assigned to EU military force that “include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”<sup>73</sup>

The need to define the position of the Eurocorps vis-à-vis NATO very quickly became evident and, in January 1993, the French and German chiefs of defense staff signed the so-called SACEUR Agreement with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (ACE). The Agreement stated that the Eurocorps can be employed in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as a main defense force in central Europe, or as a rapid-reaction peacekeeping/peacemaking force ACE-wide.

In September 1993, the conditions for the deployment of Eurocorps were established. The mission statement of Eurocorps says that “the European Corps must provide the means for Europe to conduct its own defence policy.” The decision to employ

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<sup>72</sup> Peter Schmidt, *The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1993), 16, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai08e.html>, accessed 15 March 2005

<sup>73</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Mission for EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 74

the Eurocorps “is the responsibility of the political authorities of each participating countries, in respect of its limitations imposed by national constitutions and the UN Charter.”<sup>74</sup>

By 1996, five nations were committed to Eurocorps: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain. During those years Eurocorps had conducted a series of joint exercises that confirmed their operational status. And, as a logical step, in 1998 the Eurocorps were invited by NATO to take part in SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to reinforce its Headquarters (HQ). Eurocorps deployed some 470 HQ personnel.

The slowing of the European participation in ESDI and ongoing debates among Western European countries on the future of common defense had inclined the opinions toward the fact that Europe is looking for another formula to satisfy its defense ambitions.

Important events occurred by the end of 1998 which opened a new historical era in European Defense. Under the influence of the Balkans crises that revealed the lack of European military capabilities, Great Britain and France governments concluded in December 1998 the St. Malo Agreement. The British-French initiative was the founding act of the ESDP. The adaptation of the notion “capacity for autonomous actions” represents a compromise that “lay in the effort made to improve the Europeans’ military capabilities and their intention to take on crisis management operations in the framework of the Petersberg missions.”<sup>75</sup>

## **C. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

### **1. The Development of the Military Dimension of the EU**

The beginning of 1990s was an examining period for the European Union. Influenced by ongoing changes, the Europeans realized the necessity of a move toward closer integration of the European community. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) achieved its limits of offered possibilities for extending the cooperation among

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<sup>74</sup> Charles Heyman, “The Armed Forces of European Union”, *Jane’s Special Report* (July 1997), 15

<sup>75</sup> Jean-Yves Haine, *An Historical Perspective*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 43

member states in most areas, including the security area. Concluded in February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on the EU established in its Title V the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that represented the remarkable achievement of the Union at that moment. Article J.4 of the Treaty stated that the CFSP "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of common and defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."<sup>76</sup> In this context, the WEU was seen as an integral part of the common policy and was requested "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."<sup>77</sup> In this way, the defense issues which were for a while a taboo theme became accessible for discussions.

But there were not significant improvements in this area during the following years due to non-reconciliation positions of its members. The basic developments within common defense were achieved in the WEU, which generated some common defense structures and forces capable to carry out some of the "Petersberg missions". There were principle arrangements established with NATO, such as ESDI and the Berlin Agreement, aimed to increase European participation in crisis management. As a result, WEU forces took part in joint operations with NATO in the Balkans.

The breakthrough came at the end of 1998 with St. Malo agreements between France and the United Kingdom, which stated that the common European defense should be conducted through EU. This essential change of the British position toward the issue of European defense policy was due to several factors. Among them was the coming of new Labor Government into power in Great Britain, which took more pro-European attitudes in different areas including military one. While EU began to consolidate its economic identity, to mention the intention to introduce the euro-zone, and made steps towards common foreign policy, it could not neglect the issues of security and common defense. The poor performance of Europeans in Balkans during crises made it clear that armies of European countries does not have the capacity for response to a crisis and this situation convinced most of European leaders that they have to change the position

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<sup>76</sup> Maastricht Treaty on EU, Article J.4, Internet, [http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt\\_title5.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt_title5.html), accessed 20 April 2005

<sup>77</sup> Ibid

concerning common defense and security issues. In addition, Britain realized that existing imbalance in military capabilities between Americans and Europeans will harm in long terms the Atlantic partnership, which always was a priority of its security policy. Britain and France found a compromise and took the leadership in this inevitable process.

The British-French initiative paved the way for the ESDP. As Fraser Cameron pointed out, this was a breakthrough

because of coincidence of a number of factors: The experience of Europe's military weakness in the Kosovo crisis which made all governments convinced of the need to develop an EU crisis management capacity; the fundamental change of British policy; and the supportive attitude of the United States.<sup>78</sup>

Switching of the British position on European defense issues was decisive. The adaptation of the notion "capacity for autonomous actions" represents a compromise between the British and French approach to European security that "lay in the effort made to improve the Europeans' military capabilities and their intention to take on crisis management operations in the framework of the Petersberg missions."<sup>79</sup>

The main impulse for the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), of course, was given by the changes that occurred in Europe representing a combination of factors that have been essential for its development:

1. Changes in the European security system. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet Union threat and reduced the strategic significance of Europe for the United States. Collective security and intervention abroad became the new principles of the European defense.
2. The dynamic of the European Union integration process. Economic integration was almost fully implemented over the years and the next step was the deepening of the political integration. The development of the common foreign policy naturally may request collective actions, but at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 the military issues were not brought for discussions.

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<sup>78</sup> Fraser Cameron, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*, (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 80

<sup>79</sup> Jean-Yves Haine, *An Historical Perspective*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 43

3. The big gap between the European economic power and its political strength. The European Union could make its voice heard in international economic forums, but remained muted in international security discussions.
4. External events, especially in the Balkans, imposed their own significance. The Balkans crisis showed the necessity of the collective approach to deal with such conflicts and pulled the Union's governments together in this issue. It showed also the EU military inadequacies to the requested commitments in crisis management.
5. The specific European willingness to learn from past mistakes.<sup>80</sup>

Following the St. Malo agreements, during the German presidency of the European Union, at Cologne Council in June 1999 the issue of ESDP was brought to the table. Member states agreed that Europe should have its responsibilities for its own security and defense as well as all capabilities to carry out this task<sup>81</sup>. At that summit it was decided on regular meetings, including of defense ministers; on permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC); EU Military Committee (EUMC) making recommendations to PSC; EU Military Staff (EUMS), including a Situation Center; the transfer of WEU assets to the EU; and the designation of Mr. Javier Solana as High Representative for Common and Foreign Policy.<sup>82</sup> These steps signified the institutionalization of the European common defense.

The PSC is central body of ESDP and is consisting of ambassadors from member states which have twice a week meetings. Their task is to deal with all planning work and to advise the European Council. The EUMC includes chiefs of defense or their representatives and has the task of advising and making recommendations to the PSC. The EUMS consists of experts that can provide expertise to PSC such as early warning, evaluations of situation and strategic planning in case of a crisis management operation.

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<sup>80</sup>Jean-Yves Haine, *An Historical Perspective*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 43, 35

<sup>81</sup> See Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions, Annex III, Internet, [http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe\\_en.htm#a3](http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3), accessed 26 May, 2005

<sup>82</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 6, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

The further enhancement of the ESDP was done at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 by setting a “Headline Goal” which says that by 2003 the EU states would generate a force capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 troops). These forces would have 60 days readiness and self-sustainability for at least one year.<sup>83</sup> These decisions were a step forward from the political intentions to practical implementation of the ESDP.

The next meeting of the European Council, which took part in Nice in December 2000, had approved the creation of the PSC, EUMS, and EUMC, permanent bodies aimed to boost the military dimension of the EU. The establishment of the permanent structure of the ESDP showed the decisiveness and commitments of the EU to build a credible structure in order to carry out the main provisions of the ESDP.

Later, in July 2001, by the Council of Joint Action, to the existing structures were added the EU Satellite Center and EU Institute for Security Studies, which were transferred from the WEU.

The further development of the ESDP was mainly focused on the enhancement of military capabilities of the Union (see paragraph below), efficiency of military expenses, its further institutionalization, and practical implementation of its goals.

The establishment of the new Headline Goal 2010 in December 2003 was the result of pragmatic assessment of the implementation of the Helsinki Headline Goal and the intention to put real and credible tasks for the future development of the ESDP. At Helsinki and after it the decisions were probably influenced by euphoria of integration success and by big will of EU member states to move on the track with defense issues rather than by reason of available resources and defense expenditures which participants are ready to commit. As Charles Wolf and Benjamin Zycher have observed, “...the rhetoric behind the ESDP has proceeded far more rapidly than has the acquisition of the resources required to turn the concept into a reality, whether through the provision of additional resources or the reallocation of existing resources.”<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 7

<sup>84</sup> Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher, *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), xvi

However, to switch to reality and with the aim to optimize the use of available resources and to mobilize additional ones for the building of the military capabilities for the ESDP, in July 2004 the European Defense Agency (EDA) was created. It will carry out the tasks in areas of:

- defence capabilities development;
- armaments co-operation;
- the European defence technological and industrial base and defence equipment market;
- research and technology.<sup>85</sup>

At the beginning of its activity, the EDA will work as a coordination body between existing armament agencies, as well as supporting the Council in defense capabilities issues. After that period, it will deal with issues linked with harmonization of existing capability requirements and of arrangements for common procurement projects and cost-efficiency of defense expenditures.

## **2. The Debates on ESDP within the European Union**

Addressing the development of the ESDP within the EU had focused on several issues, which awaked some concerns and difficulties. First lies in the area regarding one of the major dilemmas – the constraint of national sovereignty. Especially the “old European nations which, historically, invented and then elevated national sovereignty to the status of founding principle of political order”<sup>86</sup> are very sensitive to all means of transfer or sharing of its sovereignty within the Union. Yet, no European state is willing to delegate the military responsibilities of national defense to a kind of supranational European body. The wish to maintain this status quo is still prevailing over the idealistic idea of a common army. From other point of view, the globalization of security issues in the management of crisis pushes the Europeans to further integration politically and militarily.

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<sup>85</sup> The Council of European Union, Security and Defense, Internet, [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=277&lang=en&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=277&lang=en&mode=g), accessed 3 April 2005

<sup>86</sup> Nicole Gnesotto, *EU Security and Defense Policy. The First Five Years (1999 – 2004)*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 18

The second issue for debate is that of the EU structure and group division of its members. For example, there is a group of so-called “non-allied” countries in the EU, like Sweden or Austria, which conceive the defense issue as a national prerogative and their military policies are guided by that principle making difficulties for dialog on the ESDP. The division is also visible on the basis of “large” and “small” states. There is a big difference between France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy as a group and other EU-members in terms of population, geography, and the most essential - economics. This difference is directly linked with their current available military capabilities. “France and the United Kingdom stand out both possessing nuclear weapons and being permanent members of the UN Security Council. Their role as nuclear powers makes them unique within EU and of particular significance in any discussion of deeper, long-term, European defense issues.”<sup>87</sup> Regarding the expeditionary capabilities requested to accomplish main Petersberg tasks, only several members have some of the assets needed to assemble the requested military forces for operations. The same applies on the equipment and armament that are held by EU-members’ armed forces, and the military budgets that are committed for the ESDP purpose. This issue of differences among the EU-countries that provoked big debates in the past became more emphasized after the recent EU enlargement.

The military forces and participation in operations and the strategic vision of this problem is the third theme for debate on the ESDP. “States with a still recent imperial legacy and great power world view can be distinguished from those which are loath to project power beyond their borders: in effect, there is a Europe of extravert versus introvert countries.”<sup>88</sup> Not all of the EU-members are willing to dedicate much effort and resources to military assistance or to participate in military operations. But now the tendency, for example, of “non-allied” countries, is moving towards to greater involvement in peacekeeping operations.

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<sup>87</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 14, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 21



Differences, however, still exist and affect its scope and modus operandi. ESDP is a purely intergovernmental policy based on consensus: unanimity is required, there are no margins whatsoever for qualified majority voting, member states can not be outvoted nor compelled to field forces or pay for operations against their will.<sup>89</sup>

### **3. The Transatlantic Debates on ESDP**

From the beginning, when the idea of ESDP was birthed and throughout its development and practical implementation, one major dilemma faced by the EU building its military strength was the reconciliation of membership in the Atlantic Alliance dominated by the United States with the membership in renewed strategic and political Europe. “Apart from good intentions on both sides of the Atlantic, little is clear in the emerging new balance of power between the EU and NATO and, hence between “Europe” and the United States.”<sup>90</sup>

Regarding the relations of the EU-U.S. toward ESDP there are two extreme strategic views on that issue: “Europe alone”, the creation of European defense outside the NATO framework, and probably without U.S. defense involvement; and ultra-Atlanticist view, the Europeans will contribute to the Alliance but will not play essential role in defining its strategy or conducting operations, United States being only one real player, which extends its protection, in exchange for which Europeans are expected to “put up and shut up”, buying American arms and marching to America’s strategic drum.<sup>91</sup> These are two extremes between which current real attitudes lie. However, from the beginning the U.S. attitude vis-à-vis the ESDP was ambivalent. On the one hand, taking in account the imbalance of forces between the U.S. and Europeans that was shown in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States opted for increasing of European military capabilities in conducting peacekeeping operations. The proposition of ESDI within NATO was aimed toward a greater participation of U.S. Allies in crisis management operations, leaving space for the U.S. to decide on its participation. On the other hand,

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<sup>89</sup> Antonio Missroli, *ESDP – How It Works*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 57

<sup>90</sup> Peter van Ham, *Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 15

<sup>91</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 33, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

the increasing of EU military strength will lead to a more autonomous EU in its activity. This contradictory position of the U.S. regarding ESDP has two U.S. concerns that have dominated the debate: “the fear of political decoupling, due to the Union’s egalitarian ambitions with respect to NATO; and the converse but similar fear of a strategic decoupling, due to the technological obsolescence and inadequacy of European defense expenditure.”<sup>92</sup> The financial resources committed for European defense were always on the table of discussions. In fact, the European defense expenditure is about 60% of those of the U.S., and comparable involvement of Europeans in different major operations is far beyond from those of the U.S., which concludes that the work should be focused on better planning and coordination of available resources among EU members.

The fear of decoupling, together with these of duplication and discrimination, had formed the famous “3Ds” of concerns of the United States regarding the ESDP, shared also by some Europeans. “Yes – to the creation of effective and available European forces, no – to the emergence of a strategic Europe autonomous from NATO: in broad outline and regardless of the Administration in power in Washington, that has been the general approach of the United States towards the ESDP.”<sup>93</sup>

The issue of duplication is an ambiguous problem as well. In order to implement the main concept of the ESDP – conducting of autonomous operations, it will be inevitable for the duplication of some structures that NATO has. “The EU’s plans certainly do not involve, or imply, setting up standing European armed forces with a permanent command, at least not for the near future. But it will be difficult to foresee a serious CESDP that does not acquire better defense technology, better trained and deployable troops, as well as at least some parallel military structure.”<sup>94</sup> But not all duplication is bad.

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<sup>92</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 33, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004, 36

<sup>93</sup> Nicole Gnesotto, *EU Security and Defense Policy. The First Five Years (1999 – 2004)*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 23

<sup>94</sup> Peter van Ham, *Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 17

One of the major motivations to develop the ESDP was the striking difference of military capabilities between the Europeans and the U.S. reviled during the Balkans crisis. To diminish these differences and to improve the situation, the Cologne Summit's decisions were adopted. Debates on capabilities persisted in the transatlantic relations earlier as well, when NATO launched the European Security and Defense Identity. In this context, over the years there were concerns that European countries should spend more money for equipment's procurement and forces' development. This situation emphasized again the issue of duplication. But, as was mentioned in testimony before the U.S. Senate delivered by Dr. Larrabee in March 2000, "given the decline in European defense budgets, it is unlikely that Europeans will have the money to create such capabilities. Thus they will depend on US assets for some time to come."<sup>95</sup>

In the European view the development of their own military capabilities would request the redefinition of the transatlantic structure of decision making and action. "To the Europeans the realization of a genuinely European institutional structure with common decision-making is as important as an improvement of capabilities and structures. A stronger Europe is a prerequisite for a stronger Alliance, indeed a condition of its long-term survival."<sup>96</sup> The U.S.'s interest to help Europeans to consolidate the ESDP should be obvious as it will help to consolidate the North Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic ties. It will take some military responsibilities from the U.S.'s shoulders and will allow her to divert efforts to other regions, while at the same time being involved in European security affairs.

The debate regarding the discrimination frames some relationship between the EU and NATO. It refers primarily to non-EU NATO members that want to be involved in the decision shaping process of the ESDP. "The United States tried to formalize the EU-NATO relationship on these issues, but France had blocked these efforts and claims that the Europeans first have to clarify their military ambitions among themselves."<sup>97</sup> The

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<sup>95</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, *The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American Interests* (RAND CT-168, March 2000), 2, Internet, <http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT168.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004.

<sup>96</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 42, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chailot/cha42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

U.S. and other non-EU NATO countries also argue that even they would not involve their troops in EU-operations, that they have to be consulted during the decision-making process and NATO should be given the right of first option or refuse to intervene in these military operations.

A certain degree of discrimination will inevitably occur due to the fact that some of the countries will assume more obligations than others, as well as due their status. There is a position that if all out-of-EU countries will request to take their interests into account in different EU issues and decisions that will be not a pure EU approach. Here again arises the issue of decoupling.

Compromise in EU-NATO relations was proposed at the Washington Summit of 1999, which suggested that Europe will have a right to act autonomously, but not to decide alone. The “ESDI decisions will be discussed by Atlantic Council, which will decide if the matter should be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or left to the autonomous initiative of the EU, which could then envisage to take military action with the help of NATO.”<sup>98</sup> The further definition of the relations between the EU and NATO was achieved upon the conclusion of the “Berlin-plus” Agreements that had clarified the relations between NATO and the EU in management of crisis.

The issue of discrimination was not a pure American concern, but also involved the interests of Turkey, which expressed the desire to be admitted to the decision-making process on EU-led operations. On the basis that she was excluded from that process, Turkey vetoed the approval of the using of NATO assets in EU-led operations according to the “Berlin-plus” Agreement. The ESDP process itself was put in danger. After considerable pressure from the U.S., as well as due to the Copenhagen decision on enlargement and change of the government in Turkey, the mini-crisis was finally resolved only in December 2002, when Nice provisions regarding the Berlin-plus Agreement were signed. This eliminated at the same time the long debates on the Atlantic attitude toward the ESDP.

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<sup>97</sup> Peter van Ham, *Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 20

<sup>98</sup> François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 47, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

By the end of 2003, the EU and NATO agreed to enhance consultations and common planning capabilities. Along with this aim, it was agreed to establish a Civil/Military Cell and Operations Center in case of operations, and to consider the establishment of small EU Cell at SHAPE and NATO Liaison Team at the EUMS. These arrangements would have to help to carry out the provisions of the “Berlin-plus” Agreement and to facilitate the cooperation between NATO and EU.

## **D. EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

### **1. EU Approach to Peacekeeping**

The peacekeeping operations of today require not only the application of military force, but also “a wide range of political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other considerations are drawn down to the operational level and need to be coordinated and harmonized at that level into some of strategic framework or mission plan...”<sup>99</sup> Once again, the Iraq operation had shown the importance of the post conflict reconstruction process for bringing the situation in a conflict zone to normality.

The Europeans forged the results in crisis management area slowly but firmly. After the “Petersberg tasks” were adopted, the first document which discussed the European role in tasks relating to the emerging wider security agenda was also adopted in the WEU: “Emergency responses to Humanitarian Crises: A Role for a WEU Humanitarian Task Force”<sup>100</sup>. The Humanitarian Task Force was conceived to be used upon requests from different bodies but “...presupposed a *leading role* for the EU. It was intended to provide, among other things, 'specialized logistic assets, such as transport, engineering and communication’<sup>101</sup> for the conducting of humanitarian operations. This document pushed the work on this issue which latter was incorporated in those of the EU.

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<sup>99</sup> Philip Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies”, *International Peacekeeping* 7 (Spring 2000), 66

<sup>100</sup> This document was endorsed at WEU’s Council of Ministers in Lisbon, 15 May 1995. See Lisbon Declaration of the Council of Ministers, paragraph 6, Internet, <http://www.weu.int/documents/950515en.pdf>, accessed 24 April 2005

<sup>101</sup> Carlos Echeverria, *Cooperation in Peacekeeping Among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), 4

But the real start of the EU involvement in peace and security issues began with the including in Article 17 of the Treaty on EU<sup>102</sup> of the “Petersberg Tasks”. Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union states that “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”<sup>103</sup> All these missions represent a full range of possible missions that could be undertaken in a crisis situation which of course requires respective forces to carry them on. How and when these forces would be used, which is important for the legitimization of any mission, is described in another Article of the EU Treaty. Article 11.1 is the constitutional norm according to which all operations have to be conducted. It declares *inter alia* that the EU shall “...preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nation Charter...” and “...develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”<sup>104</sup>

The obvious evidence in favor of the creation of force which will carry out the crisis management missions according the EU Treaty was the controversial performance of Europeans in Bosnia and Kosovo. EU states undertook only forty percent of air sorties in comparison with the U.S. and made rather minor contributions to intelligence, logistics and communications. This experience was the main argument at the Helsinki EU Council meeting in 1999 in favor of a “headline goal” which set the creation of Rapid Reaction Force capable of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days to the field with the sustainability for one year.

The great willingness of the Europeans to build and develop such forces was confirmed in the European Constitution, which was adopted but not yet ratified by all EU member states. The Constitution had developed further the principles of the use of European Union military forces and their tasks and missions in case of crises. The principles of use of forces were specified in Article I-41(1):

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<sup>102</sup> See Treaty of Nice on amendments of the Treaty on European Union, Internet, [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C\\_EN.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf), accessed 13 February 2005

<sup>103</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 74

<sup>104</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 76

The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.<sup>105</sup>

There are no geographical limits and there is a broad interpretation of terms that may provide authority to any mission. Missions themselves were described in Article III-309 which is directly linked with the Petersberg tasks. It says:

The tasks referred to in Article I-41(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.<sup>106</sup>

Again, in case it becomes necessary, the Constitution should maintain that there are enough legal provisions to allow EU military forces to carry out any type of mission.

In December 2003, aiming to support the ESDP and to specify the policies for use of EU forces in management of crises, the EU Council endorsed the European Security Strategy. Drafted by Javier Solana, the EU “Foreign Minister”, the Strategy is an important cell in the chain of whole EU military dimension. Regarding peacekeeping, it gives us the main principles of the European Union approach to this issue:

- The need to react early, rapidly, and when necessary robustly to potential threats and challenges;
- Close cooperation with NATO during EU peacekeeping missions may be an option for the EU;
- The EU military operations may be conducted simultaneously with humanitarian missions.

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<sup>105</sup> European Union Constitution, Internet, [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/ptoc8\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/ptoc8_en.htm), accessed 24 April 2005

<sup>106</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 79

The EU approach to peacekeeping is in many cases distinctive and includes three main issues: geography of the utilization of forces, mandate, and the circumstances when EU military forces will be chosen.

As was mentioned above, there are no geographical zones specified in the main EU documents on the use of military forces. It is understood that such forces would be used first of all in Europe and its close neighborhood, but not limited to that zone. The events in former Yugoslavia showed that Europe needed such forces to take care of its “own backyard”, as many diplomats say. Theoretically, EU forces could intervene everywhere in the world for “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”, as it is written in the EU Constitution. So, there are not any limitations from a geographical point of view. The first practical application of forces already demonstrate this where the EU got involved, upon a call of the United Nations, in an operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo code named Artemis.

Regarding mandate, there is also a broad interpretation of the documents’ provisions. But all documents underline that EU operations must have in principle a UN mandate and should be conducted according the UN Charter.<sup>107</sup> This question was debatable along the period of installation of the intervention mechanism in case of crisis. In some cases, as was in Yugoslavia, there was no prior UN mandate for operation. The situation dictated that immediate action be taken. There are other examples where individual countries took the initiative to act without prior UN mandate in order to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. “This means that, in addition to operations authorized by UNSC, an EU force might also undertake military action in the absence of such a mandate if needed. However, the situations in which this would be possible are quite limited.”<sup>108</sup> First, EU forces would act in this way in case of danger of humanitarian catastrophes when all member states agree; and second, all EU operations must be conducted applying principles of the Chapter of the UN.

For Europeans it is very important to maintain close cooperation with the UN. In this context, it is worth mentioning the signing in September 2003 of a joint declaration

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<sup>107</sup> See EU Constitution, Internet, [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/allinone\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/allinone_en.htm), accessed 28 May, 2005

<sup>108</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 85



on cooperation in crisis management which provides “a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility” in the field of training, communication and best practices.”<sup>109</sup> In other words, the EU has a holistic approach to the UN legitimization of their operations.

What will the conditions be when EU forces would be chosen to act and intervene in a crisis? The experts in the field have four distinct options according to which EU forces could be involved in an operation: individual, ad hoc coalition, NATO operations, and EU-led operations. Each option depends of many factors that play their role in each involvement of a EU country in an operation. Until now, the EU member states have acted in all four types of operations: some countries such as Great Britain (Falkland Islands conflict) and Spain (Perejil Island incident) – unilaterally, the last Iraqi campaign was an ad hoc coalition, NATO operation was in former Yugoslavia, and pure EU operation was Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo.

But why did they decide to use EU forces and not any other? This is not an easy question to answer. “However, member states might be inclined to choose the EU military option for reasons connected with the idea of legitimacy, on the one hand, and with more practical considerations, on the other. A European force may be useful in certain circumstances, because the EU flag might confer a unique legitimacy to a given operation.”<sup>110</sup> The practical considerations as logistical or economical reasons are also important when decision is taken to launch an operation.

There is a general political approach of the EU to be involved in active crisis operations. Because the military dimension was a late addition to the political and economic power of the EU, it will remain this late addition and will be regarded as this one by Europeans. “The “strategic personality” that is emerging within the EU is one that wields military power reluctantly, and as a last resort.”<sup>111</sup> Military force will be applied when other means of influence do not give the desired results and do not influence the

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<sup>109</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 86

<sup>110</sup> Martin Ortega, *Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forces*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 86

<sup>111</sup> Joanna Spear, *Is There a Distinctive “European” Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operations?*, (American Consortium on EU Studies Publications, 2004), 11, Internet, [www.american.edu/aces/aces\\_papers/ACES-case-Spear.rtf](http://www.american.edu/aces/aces_papers/ACES-case-Spear.rtf), Accessed 2 March 2005

situation. This approach was demonstrated during the Iraq crisis, when the U.S. and major EU players had “quite different” opinions over this issue. “Europe’s historical and cultural proclivities in dealing with threats and diplomatic problems, the issues it pays most attention to, the way it prioritizes and interprets international events, evolving military planning and the public statements of EU leaders all provide evidence of “personality traits.”<sup>112</sup> All this influences now, and will influence in the future, decisions and conducting by Europeans of peacekeeping operations.

The approach between the U.S. and others on a lower level regarding the practical conducting of operations, for example rules of engagement, could prove very interesting. “In particular, there is a significant difference between U.S. and the rest concerning the primary mission of the soldier; for the U.S. officer the primary mission is force protection. This is not necessarily the case for European officers, who may (and have) prioritize civilian protection over force protection.”<sup>113</sup> And further on a tactical level, for example, the British in Iraq now are wearing berets on the streets when patrolling, without sunglasses, and their arms are pointed down in order to allow locals to see their eyes and to show no intention to shoot immediately. This is due the experience they had in Northern Ireland. American troops usually have to be armored in helmets and with guns upwards ready for action.

## **2. Force Projection**

For practical implementation of their goals in peacekeeping, the Europeans realized the need of forces that can be capable of carrying out the full range of crisis management missions.

Previously, there was a controversial experience in the performance of European military forces in the Balkan crises that underline the big gap in capabilities between them and their NATO ally, the United States. Some of the deficiencies were already mentioned above. The main shortfalls which undermined the EU capacity for autonomous actions were:

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<sup>112</sup> Joanna Spear, *Is There a Distinctive “European” Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operations?*, (American Consortium on EU Studies Publications, 2004), 26, Internet, [www.american.edu/aces/aces\\_papers/ACES-case-Spear.rtf](http://www.american.edu/aces/aces_papers/ACES-case-Spear.rtf), Accessed 2 March 2005.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 18

- Deployability
- Mobility
- Sustainability
- Effective Engagement
- Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).<sup>114</sup>

The first step to address the gap in capabilities and to create the necessary military capacity of the EU for autonomous actions was already done at Helsinki, when the EU Council set the “Headline Goal” which provided that member states, by the end of 2003, will achieve the capability to generate and be ready to deploy up to 60,000 troops within 60 days and sustain them for at least one year. These forces will be a pool of national military capabilities and will be able to conduct a full range of Petersberg missions.

Some things were done and some things were not, and by the end of 2003 these goals were not all achieved. But despite that, Europeans had already implemented some successful operations which indicated that their efforts give results and they are on the right track.

At the same time, when the EU was developing its military institutions and arrangements with other organizations, the member states continued to elaborate the military Headline Goal setting principles and proper military assets provided by EU members for the Rapid Reaction Forces. The quantity of those forces was achieved, but member states agree that they should improve their quality. At the EU Council in Nice in December 2000:

member states therefore decided to set up a review mechanism, encompassing the following objectives:

- evaluation and, if necessary, revision of EU capability goals;
- monitoring of the force catalogue;
- identification and harmonization of national contributions;
- quantitative and qualitative review of progress toward previously approved pledges in terms of interoperability and availability.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> For more information see Burkard Schmitt, *European Capabilities – How Many Divisions*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 95-96

The EU announced in May 2003 that its Rapid Reaction Force is capable to conduct the full range of Petersberg missions, “but recognized that the force would still be limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls in certain defense capabilities.”<sup>116</sup>

As a consequence of this activity, there were considerable shortfalls in national commitments to forces in different aspects revealed. To address these shortfalls, in 2001 the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) that instituted 19 panels of national experts capable to elaborate possible solutions and to develop some strategies for reducing of capabilities gaps was adopted. Established later were ECAP Project groups in which member states may seek to implement certain capabilities according the proposals of the panels. ECAP proved itself as a significant tool which gives improvement in EU military capabilities.

But, as many analysts assessed the situation, the main problem of the still existing gaps in capabilities is the underfunding of proposed goals within the ESDP. However Europeans, for many reasons, are not ready yet to spend more money on defense, despite all debates that have been held with the U.S. in NATO and their commitments to the ESDP.

In light of the dim prospects for increased defense spending in the near term, EU officials emphasize that they do not need to match US defense capabilities exactly – which they view increasingly impossible – and stress they can fill critical gaps by spending existing defense resources more wisely. EU leaders point out that rationalizing member states’ respective defense efforts and promoting multinational projects to reduce internal operating costs have been key goals of ECAP. Some options under consideration in ECAP include: leasing commercial assets (primarily for air transport); sharing or pooling of national assets among several member states; “niche” specialization, in which one or more member state would assume responsibility for providing a particular capability; and more joint procurement projects.<sup>117</sup>

One thing that probably should be mentioned in this context is that the development of EU capabilities for conducting a full range of “Petersberg tasks” by *per se* is a challenging task. In such a short period of time, and despite the fact that every

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<sup>115</sup> For more information see Burkard Schmitt, *European Capabilities – How Many Divisions*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 92

<sup>116</sup> CRS report for Congress, “NATO and the European Union”, 6 April 2004, 14

<sup>117</sup> CRS report for Congress, “NATO and the European Union”, 6 April 2004, 15

country has its own armed forces more or less capable to carry out some missions, it was very difficult to implement that. The Helsinki Headline Goal was merely determined by the events in the Balkans and better signifies the great willingness of Europeans to actively participate in the world security system, and particularly in the management of crises.

By the end of 2003, a new Headline Goal 2010 was adopted as a consequence of the failure of the EU to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal and undertaking of a more pragmatic approach toward the creation of military capacity of the Union. It consists of a set of elements aimed to develop needed EU military capabilities to conduct a full range of crisis management operations and also took into account the new unconventional threats. Its main provisions are:

- The establishment of Civil-Military Planning Cell within the EUMS (by 2004)
- The creation of European Defense Agency (by 2004)
- The implementation of EU Strategic Lift Joint Coordination (by 2005)
- The achieving of full capacity and efficiency in airlift and creation of European Airlift Command (by 2010)
- Rapid Deployable Battlegroups (by 2007)
- EU Aircraft Carrier (by 2008)
- An appropriate Compatibility and Network Linkage of all communication assets (by 2010)<sup>118</sup>

These tasks are set in much pragmatically and practical manner which gives to EU member states a hope that they will achieve their goals. The Headline Goal 2010 underlines the importance of the interoperability in all spheres of activity of EU institutions and involving its partners - NATO and the UN. This will include the cooperation in the field of military capabilities.

From all of them, this thesis will underline the so-called “battle group” concept, the implementation of which will considerably raise the readiness of Europeans to conduct operations in every part of the world. Adopted in April 2004, the concept provides the creation of credible battle group-size force packages (1,500) including

<sup>118</sup> For more information see EU Headline Goal 2010, Internet, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, accessed 23 April 2005

supporting elements and combat services support, capable of being deployed within 15 days in response to a crisis. They will be designed, though not exclusively, to be used in response to a request from the United Nations and capable for autonomous Chapter VII mandate operations. It is important to mention, that the principle of multinational approach to the crisis response operations will be the cornerstone of future European battle groups. This approach has also an economical reason in situation when EU members recognized the lack of crisis management capabilities.

The “battle group” concept is aimed to fill one of the most important EU military gaps – that of having troops at the EU disposal designed and trained for conducting crisis management operations. During the Initial Operational Capabilities period (2005-2006), the EU has to be ready to provide at least one coherent battle group package force to undertake one battle group-sized operation. From 2007 on, the EU will have the capacity to conduct two rapid response battle group-size operations with the possibility of launching them almost simultaneously.<sup>119</sup>

As one can see, the force projection is a serious step which EU states implement by using all means of building: institutional, assets, and legal. In parallel to that, some practical steps that were done resulted in real operations on the ground. These operations also offered precious information and generated some corrections in the whole process of the building of EU military capabilities.

### **3. Operation “Concordia”**

The first real EU military peacekeeping operation in its history was operation “Concordia”, launched in March 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The goal of this operation was the further contribution and maintaining of the stable environment in the country upon request of Macedonian President Trajkovski. The operation made use of NATO assets, thus being the first instance of “Berlin-Plus” cooperation between NATO and the EU. In the operation, there were engaged some 400 lightly armed military personnel under the operational command of Deputy SACEUR,

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<sup>119</sup> See ESDP Presidency Report from 17 December 2004, Internet, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP%20Presidency%20Report%2017.12.04.pdf>, accessed 23 April 2005

German Admiral Rainer Feist, with SHAPE being the EU Operational HQ. The operation lasted until December 2003, and was followed by the EU police operation Proxima.

#### **4. Operation “Artemis”**

The next major peacekeeping operation in which the EU got engaged was the first “out of area” EU operation, code-named “Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It started in June 2003 and was conducted according to UN Security Council Resolution 1484, in close cooperation with the UN Mission in DRC. The operation was aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, Ituri province of Congo. The force generation for “Artemis” was done using the scheme of “framework nation” with France being the lead-nation. The EU Operation Commander was Major General Neveux commanding from HQ in Paris. The Force Commander was also a French general with the HQ based in Entebbe, Uganda, and an outpost in Bunia. The operation involved in total approximately 2,000 military personnel, 1,400 of them being French.

The significance of operation “Artemis” is obvious. It was the first EU autonomous “out of area” operation without any NATO contribution. The launch of this operation showed the EU capacity to respond quickly to a crisis situation. It is encouraging that at this relatively early stage in the development of ESDP, the EU has shown itself capable of responding to a UN appeal for help in a humanitarian crisis. At the same time, “Artemis” also revealed some problems experienced by EU troops, the bulk of them being strategic airlift capability.

Operation “Artemis” ended in September 2003, when a reinforced UN presence took over in Bunia. Later, in January 2005, the EU got involved again in Congo, launching a police operation EUPOL-Kinshasa.

#### **5. Operation “Althea”**

The major EU commitment in the peacekeeping area was of course the launching in December 2004 of operation “Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU decision to launch this operation followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR operation.

“Althea” is being conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities implying the “Berlin-plus” Agreement between NATO and EU. The aim of the operation is to deploy a robust EUFOR force, starting at the same level as NATO SFOR with 7,000 troops, and with a Chapter VII mission to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement, and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Operation Commander was appointed Deputy SACEUR British General John Reith with Force Commander exercised also by a British general with the HQ in Sarajevo.

Operation “Althea” proves the willingness of Europeans to take care of their own “back yard”. It also proves the rightness of the decisions for close cooperation between NATO and EU in resolving crises, and takes in account some lessons learned from past operations.

#### **E. THE WAY AHEAD**

The next few years will be decisive for the further development of the ESDP. This is linked with the development of the EU itself, and in particular with the ratification of the EU Constitution. The new Treaty contains provisions that are directly related to the ESDP. They range “from the creation of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs to the solidarity clause against terrorist attacks, up to the implementation of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ on defence.”<sup>120</sup> However, the ESDP already gained enough ground militarily and politically and has enough legal bases to develop into an entity that was intended. The ratification of the Constitution would give much impetus and legitimacy to the ESDP process.

The decision making within ESDP will be an issue that should be taken seriously as well. With the recent enlargement of the EU that brought its membership to 25, and the possibility for future enlargement, it will be much more complicated to build consensus, especially within the defense area where decisions require very complex commitments of the member states. The differences in resources and possibilities make states want to pretend they have a different status within the ESDP which also shape the decisions.

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<sup>120</sup> Antonio Missroli, *ESDP – How It Works*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 72



In other words, while EU states are formally equal in representation and decision making, some are ‘more equal’ than others in terms of capabilities that may be needed to conduct an effective ESDP, be they military (forces, equipment, industrial base), commercial, civilian or diplomatic.<sup>121</sup>

To achieve the consensus on some debatable decisions there will be a need for more time and effort than was necessary before the enlargement. The results and the way in which the EU will achieve the purposed military capabilities level, according Headline Goal 2010, will give to ESDP a credit or a dismiss. It depends on how Europeans would handle this important issue, whether in a pragmatic way or if rhetoric will prevail over the practice and reality. The lessons learned from the implementation of the Headline Goal 2003 showed that in that case governments of the member states utilized more rhetoric than their commitments to realize the military capabilities which were needed for the conducting of a full range of crisis management operations. A good move in right direction was the adaptation of the ECAP and the creation of the EDA. By using these tools, the process of building European military capabilities already acquired some credibility to internal and external actors. But still, in many cases, the optimism of firsts is not shared by that of lasts, namely American experts. Regarding one strategic option adopted by the EU for building military capabilities, they said

that promises to spend existing defense resources more wisely have not yet materialize in any substantial way. They doubt that EU member states will be willing to make the hard choices that could ultimately produce more “bang for the euro” because these could infringe on national sovereignty or entail difficult political decisions.<sup>122</sup>

Indeed, the main problem that EU members face now in developing military capabilities continues to be that of defense expenditures. Statistics point to the stagnation or even decreasing of the defense assignments in the budgets of the majority of EU members, but especially of major NATO members. This is regarded by many experts as being in conflict with the adopted policies regarding the ESDP. For example, from an American point of view, “the ESDP within EU is a complex mixture of rhetoric, strategy,

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<sup>121</sup> Antonio Missroli, *ESDP – How It Works*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 70

<sup>122</sup> CRS report for Congress, “NATO and the European Union”, 6 April 2004, 15

politics, and to a lesser extent, economics.”<sup>123</sup> Of course, the restructuring of the European defense industry together with ECAP and EDA arrangements will yield results, but it seems that without the increasing of defense spending EU member states will face difficulties in achieving required levels of military capabilities for the ESDP. This will be a problem that the EU has to find a solution to in the next five years.

Another difficulty in this area is the military effectiveness of the projected forces for RRF. It is eroded by the duplication of states’ efforts to contribute to common force and by status of forces of some European armies. In the first case, it is imposed by the situation when the European army does not exist by definition. Each state maintains an army with all infrastructures, headquarters, logistic, etc. that decrease the money spending efficiency. Secondly, there are differences in status of armies, even among the NATO members: from 25 EU countries only 8 have professional armies, others have conscript or a mixed system of completion with personnel. Usually conscription armies are oversized and take a big part of defense budgets, and when they are used for crisis management operations the efficiency is less than those with contractors. The remaining funds are not sufficient for the procurements of new equipment that have to be in possession of a modern army. For example, Germany, Greece and Italy, which have armies based on conscription, in 1999 had total personnel of 760,000, or in comparison to that of the U.S., constitute 55 percent. All three countries spent \$8.3 billion for equipment that represent only 10 percent of the American portion assigned for equipment procurement.<sup>124</sup>

Despite some concerns on the future of the ESDP, the successful implementation of Headline Goal 2010 would permit the EU to be ready for immediate response in case of crises. Together with preventive diplomacy, it would be an efficient option offered by the EU for crisis management and diminishing of tensions theoretically in all parts of the globe.

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<sup>123</sup> Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher, *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 2

<sup>124</sup> See François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2000), 97, Internet, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai42e.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2004

## IV. CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era caused major transformations within the European security system, and in particular in European security organizations. It was a two way process: security organizations, while reacting to the changes of the security environment and adapting their policy, structure, and means of influence to those changes, and at the same time also had a great impact to the environment eliminating or diminishing security threats and contributing to a more secure and stabile Europe. All three organizations, OSCE, NATO and EU, which create a system of interlocking security organizations, have their functions in this system that are most appropriate to them to be carried out. If the OSCE “specializes” more in preventive diplomacy and human dimension, NATO may deal with force-requiring crisis management and less diplomacy. While the EU can contribute in both of these ways, complementing the efforts of the OSCE and NATO, or by acting alone when they are not involved directly, EU involvement is a much more convenient option to deal with a specific crisis. This system of interlocking security institutions became a core of the European security system.

For NATO, the period after 1989 was probably the most challenging in its activity and ambivalent in its purpose. The challenging aspect was due to a series of transformations which it succeeded in internally, and due to the military operations that the organization conducted in Europe and outside of its borders. Ambivalence was due to the change of its main task – to defend Europe from a major invasion - and assumed new responsibilities: crisis management and antiterrorist operations. In order to accommodate the changes in the security environment, the North Atlantic Alliance proposed a series of initiatives, including the PfP Program, ESDI, CJTF, as well as some arrangements with WEU, EU, and OSCE for the enhancing of cooperation among these organizations, and increasing their efficiency in dealing with security threats. For a while the North Atlantic Alliance will remain the main military pillar of the European security system.

NATO had transformed itself in 1990s and took an inclination toward a more political organization than it was during the Cold War. This position NATO obtained through EAPC became a security forum for NATO members and PfP partners with

possibilities to discuss issues ranging from common security and defense to environment protection. As a result of NATO enlargement, the Alliance also became a guarantor or a catalyst for consolidation of democracy and democratic institutions in new member states, as well as for their further integration in the European community.

The OSCE played an essential role in the whole post-Cold War European security architecture, first and foremost being a security forum for European states with most representative quota. This was very important after the drastic changes in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of former communist regimes and the appearance of new independent states. The OSCE is considered a unique organization because it is the only European security structure that offers a comprehensive set of tools which allow a complex approach to a situation of tension or crisis: human rights, elections' monitoring, preventive diplomacy, CSBM, long-term conflict prevention, ceasefire mediation and rule of law monitoring.

However, the OSCE did not obtain the status of a pan-European security organization "from Vancouver to Vladivostok", as many of its members desired. This was due to its legal status when the decisions are bounded by political commitments only, and due to competitive self interests of major member states. Unfortunately for the effectiveness of the European security system, the 'OSCE-first' and 'NATO-first' views competed with each other during the 1990s. Many experts complained that the United States' treatment of the OSCE as a secondary organization had diminished her potential and was even among the causes which lead to OSCE failures in the Balkans when it tried to prevent the bloodshed.<sup>125</sup>

The emergence of the EU as a major actor on the European continent in the security area is linked directly with the transformations that occurred in Europe, and merely as a consequence of those changes. The decisions of European leaders to build a military dimension of the EU was dictated by the clear necessity to take care of their "own backyard" in light of the European performance during the Kosovo crisis when the lack of European military capabilities to deal with a crisis of such magnitude was revealed. The adaptation of the ESDP widened the potential for very effective crisis

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<sup>125</sup> See for example Daniel Nelson, *America and Collective Security in Europe*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 112-118

management and gave additional options in case of any tension either within Europe or outside of it. The practice showed that the crisis management strategy of the EU is right and that it gives palpable results. The operations in Macedonia, Congo and, recently taken over from NATO, operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are among those.

But the EU has yet to overcome some issues if it wants to achieve the purposed goals within the defense area. First, there are concerns regarding relations between EU policies and national interests of its members which sometimes severely influence the outcomes; and second, in relations with other security organizations. In the first case, it deals with the delegation of national sovereignty, but this is a common issue of the EU, the group division among member states, and the military commitments in case of operations. In the second case, it refers to transatlantic relations. The debates on duplication, decoupling, and discrimination dominated the agenda of transatlantic relations in a report of NATO/ESDP, especially in the beginning, after adaptation of the ESDP. In this context, the liquidation of the military capabilities gap still remains the main issue that the EU is currently working on. The Headline Goal 2010 and all arrangements provided by its provisions will help to narrow that gap. Achieving all goals regarding military capabilities is still in question because European governments avoid devoting enough funds for that purpose, military budgets being in stagnation or even decreasing<sup>126</sup>. The transatlantic relations are still influenced by suspicion and concerns which did not fade completely, and there are many skeptics left on both sides of the Atlantic. Concluding on this issue, it is necessary to mention that the existing “rivalry” between Atlanticists and Europeanists was one of the factors that shaped the development and policies of the European security organizations after the Cold War.

The European security organizations have to overcome competing with each other in order to enhance the efficiency of the security system. The solution for success is that they have to mutually reinforce their efforts of acting in close cooperation in case of a crisis. Correctly assessing threats and addressing the correct solution to them, which may be contained in one or more organization, is the key for preserving security and stability on the continent and beyond.

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<sup>126</sup> See for example Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher, *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), chapter II

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